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AFIT/GEM/ENV/10-M11 
Abstract 
 
The United States (U.S.) electric grid is considered one of the greatest inventions 
of the twentieth century, yet it become apparent over the past few decades that it is not 
without its own set of problems.  The deregulation of the U.S. electric system in the late 
1990s eliminated monopolies and resulted in the nation's generation, transmission, and 
distribution systems becoming separate entities owned and operated by multiple 
companies.  This created a market economy in which many electric companies failed to 
plan for the future, did not invest in maintenance and upgrades, and began to push the 
aggregate system to its maximum capacity.  A number of cascading power outages in the 
late 1990s, culminated by the complete blackout of the northeastern U.S. in 2003, have 
subsequently caused the federal government to question the reliability of the nation's 
deregulated electric grid and take action to remedy current issues. 
Therefore, the objective of this study was to leverage the trend and spatial 
analysis capabilities embedded in typical geographic information system (GIS) platforms 
to examine power outage data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA).  
Utilizing the industry standard for GIS, ArcGIS, interpolation using the inverse distance 
weighted approach was used to calculate preliminary vulnerability levels at military 
installations based on EIA’s power outage database from 2000 to 2009.  The results of 
the study offer insight that will help key stakeholders better understand the state of the 
nation's electric grid and identify areas of concern.  This allows stakeholders to be in a 
better position to address associated vulnerabilities by making appropriate plans for either 
system upgrades or mitigation efforts.   
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SECURITY VULNERABILITY TRENDS RELATED TO ELECTRIC 
POWER SUPPLIED AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS 
 
Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 
Vulnerability and security concerns with the electric grid are increasing as the 
United States (U.S.) continues to “operate critical infrastructure systems closer to their 
stability or capacity limits” (Mili, Qiu, & Phadkey, 2004).  Compounding this concern is 
the overall effect on the nation’s power grid by significant events within the past decade, 
to include deregulation, terrorist attacks, and natural disasters (Mili et al., 2004; Lerner, 
2003; Masse, O’Neill, & Rollins, 2007).  Questions have also arisen regarding power 
companies’ abilities to deliver reliable power to U.S. consumers.  These concerns have 
sparked the creation of regulations aimed at mitigating power failures.  However, with 
regulation efforts still in the early stages, it is unclear if vulnerability and security 
concerns with the electric grid will be resolved or if historical trends are an indicator of 
future regional power reliability problems. (Mili, Qiu, & Phadkey, 2004; Lerner, 2003; Masse, O'Neill, & Rollins, 2007) 
Researchers who have investigated the underlying causes of reported power 
failures have observed an inverse relationship between power consumption and power 
system maintenance (Rietz, 2008).  This is partially due to the failure of the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to adequately regulate the nation’s power 
system (Ayres, Ayres, & Pokrovsky, 2005).  The FERC regulates the nation’s power 
system without sufficient manning to effectively manage and create reliability standards.  
As a result, the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) was created in 1968 
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as an “informal, voluntary organization of operating personnel to facilitate coordination 
of the bulk power system” (NERC, 2008; About FERC, 2009).  It was anticipated that by 
combining the FERC’s regulatory power and the NERC’s technical expertise, the power 
grid should improve in overall reliability and quality.  However, prior to the passing of 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), the NERC lacked sufficient authority to 
enforce their own standards.   
Rising concerns with the current status of the power grid is not limited to 
consumers and has the potential to significantly impact the Department of Defense 
(DoD).  The increasing frequency of power failures within the national grid (Mili et al., 
2004) is a concern among base commanders, yet instances of prolonged outages raise the 
largest concern since mission capability can be seriously jeopardized (Defense Science 
Board Task Force, 2008).  Vulnerabilities within the electric grid have raised interest 
among military installations as they come to the realization that they are more vulnerable 
to power issues as they have become increasingly dependent on commercial power.  Each 
incident reinforces the notion that bases must be able to adequately supply power to their 
critical infrastructure to maintain mission capability.  Unfortunately, no tool exists to 
determine overall vulnerability to future power outages at military installations.  
Therefore, this research attempts to fill that void by utilizing geographic information 
systems (GIS) to determine the associated vulnerability to future outages.  Utilizing 
historical power outage information and interpolation tools within GIS, it is possible to 
develop detailed maps showing historical vulnerability levels across the U.S.   
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Background 
The need for reliable power is an increasing concern for consumers as the 
dependence on electricity to perform routine activities has increased.  This is also true for 
military installations as the need for consistent power to critical infrastructure and 
facilities has become a requirement for continual mission operations.  However, recent 
widespread power failures have identified several weaknesses within the nation’s power 
grid (Mili et al., 2004).  Weaknesses ranging from deteriorated equipment to lack of 
physical security amplify the grid’s vulnerability to not only a terrorist attack but also to 
human errors that result in catastrophic failures (Cieslewicz, 2004).   These areas have 
been the basis for the increased concerns regarding power reliability and the focus of both 
the NERC and FERC to help mitigate rising concerns.   
The FERC was initially intended to “regulate the sale and transportation of 
electricity” (History of FERC, 2009).  Over the years though, the FERC gained additional 
responsibilities such that the sale and transportation of electricity was no longer its main 
focus.  In 1962, the electric industry created the NERC, an informal voluntary 
organization of operating personnel, to facilitate coordination of the power system in the 
U.S. and Canada in an effort to manage the grid’s increasing complexity and size.  
Unfortunately, the policies created by the NERC included voluntary compliance that 
were not mandated until EPAct 2005 (Abshier, 2007; McDonald, 2008).  The power 
wielded by the FERC was limited to regulating existing standards, whereas the NERC 
was responsible for creating standards but lacked regulatory authority (Mili et al., 2004).  
Basically, the NERC is aware of problems within the electric grid and creates policies to 
correct the situation yet lacks adequate authority to mandate compliance.   
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The FERC-mandated deregulation of the electric industry created additional 
problems with the electric grid as the dynamics of transmission and distribution were 
altered.  Deregulation attempted to create a market economy and provide open access for 
any electricity supplier.  However, it essentially forced inter-reliance on existing 
transmission and distribution power lines.  Although not initially anticipated, 
deregulation minimized direct government involvement in ensuring the system was being 
managed and maintained adequately (McDonald, 2008).  Prior to deregulation, power 
was supplied to users through geographically separated electric companies who 
maintained their own power generation and transmission capabilities.  Therefore, 
companies had a vested interest in maintaining their assets to ensure not only adequate 
supply capability but also future growth capability.  Following deregulation in 1996 
though, no single electric company could own multiple components of the electric grid’s 
generation, transmission, and distribution lines.  This aided in the elimination of any 
monopolies and created a market economy in which electricity began to be traded as a 
commodity (Arrillaga, Bollen, & Watson, 2000).  Unfortunately, as these components 
became separate entities, owned and operated by multiple companies, companies failed to 
plan for the future and began to push existing lines to maximum capacity (Lerner, 2003).  
It became evident during a rash of power outages in 1996, 1998, and 1999 that 
deregulation did not solve the problems with widespread outages; instead, it put 
additional stress on the electric grid as systems were operated closer to their maximum 
capacity and little money was invested in maintenance and upgrades (Arrillaga et al., 
2000; Lerner, 2003). 
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The consequences from the failed attempt of deregulation ultimately raised 
concerns with consumers as they became increasingly reliant on power and the 
responsiveness of electric companies during outages and emergencies (McDonald, 2008).  
This essentially resulted in a blind dependence on financially motivated companies 
supplying a service critical to nearly all aspects of modern-day life.  In fact, power 
outages are not only inconvenient but can cost consumers significant amounts of money.  
Assigning a monetary value to power outages has sparked multiple studies intended to 
investigate the costs associated with power outages within residential, commercial, and 
industrial consumers (Eto & LaCommare, 2008).  The studies estimate that power 
interruptions within the U.S. cost consumers anywhere from $22 to $135 billion each 
year (LaCommare & Eto, 2004).  Although this financial burden felt by most consumers 
is quite high, it does not necessarily compare with Air Force installations and the possible 
impact on critical missions and national security. 
The decreasing reliability of the national power grid has also received attention 
within the DoD and Air Force regarding how to address the deteriorating power grid and 
efforts to mitigate its risks (Aimone, 2009; Defense Science Board Task Force, 2008).  
Part of the concern for the Air Force is that existing manning levels have limited the 
service’s capabilities to provide backup power to critical infrastructure assets which are 
tested only for intermittent power outages (HQ AFCESA/CEOA, 2009; HQ 
AFCESA/CES, 2005).  In fact, Air Force installations have become so dependent on 
reliable power that manning for internal power generation and electrical support has 
steadily decreased.  One of the main reasons for this decrease has been a need to commit 
more funds to the replacement of deteriorating airframes (Scully, 2008).  The manning 
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and associated funding cuts were justified based on the assumption that the local grid is 
capable of supplying reliable power needed for the base to operate.  There is a downside 
to this increased reliance though, which is the resulting lack of organic base capability to 
provide sufficient power to counter the increasing number of power failures in both 
duration and magnitude (Mili et al., 2004). 
According to Air Force policy, “it is important to identify and protect those 
(critical) infrastructures that are truly critical to the Air Force so it can accomplish its 
worldwide mission” (Dix, 2006).  However, problems exist within each base in 
determining the critical assets necessary to sustain mission operations since each base 
organization feels they constitute a critical function.  This in turn creates confusion about 
which facilities to support during power outages and makes apparent the inability to 
support a large volume of requests.  In conjunction with the Air Force Civil Engineer’s 
lack of adequate capabilities and manning, the backup capability on Air Force 
installations cannot be adequately determined (Defense Science Board Task Force, 2008).  
Air Force guidance regarding emergency generator management sparsely mentions 
prolonged power outages and focuses mainly on intermittent power failures (HQ 
AFCESA/CEOA, 2009).  This lack of planning for a worst-case scenario compounds 
electricity concerns if power failures persist beyond the planned duration of generator 
fuel and manning capabilities. 
The intention of this research was to demonstrate an approach to assessing 
vulnerabilities to certain types of power outages.  Although the findings are specific to 
Air Force installations, they are considered generalizable to other non-DoD agencies as 
well.  Additionally, many private organizations share the Air Force’s concerns regarding 
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the reliability of the power grid, yet their motivation lies mainly with minimizing 
financial losses due to the loss of worker productivity.  This analysis of power outages 
surrounding Air Force installations will address associated vulnerabilities while 
proposing ways to help mitigate concerns for future outages.  
 
Problem Statement 
As a whole, the nation has become increasingly dependent on reliable power to 
perform daily operations.  However, it is not until power is lost that individuals realize 
how dependent society has become on the availability of consistent, reliable electricity.  
Herein lies the problem with which this study is focused:  increased dependence on 
electricity has made people and organizations more vulnerable to the effects of prolonged 
commercial power outages.  To address this problem, this research relied on the Air 
Force as a case study.   
Problems with reliable power will not go away anytime soon and will continue to 
have a significant impact on consumers until they are addressed.  With the concerns over 
forced deregulation and changes within the power grid, it is no longer realistic to simply 
rely on supplied power.  Power supplied over the electric grid tends to be at the mercy of 
old technology operating outside its suggested life expectancy.  As a result, deteriorated 
equipment has spiked a large increase in blackouts in recent years and has brought to the 
forefront the issue of the nation’s electric grid (Abshier, 2007).  Although efforts by the 
FERC and the NERC are underway to standardize security measures across the electric 
grid, efforts will require time to be completely developed and implemented.  Meanwhile, 
the electric grid is still failing to provide uninterrupted power to consumers.  This will 
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continue to be problematic to DoD installations and their ability to sustain operations 
during prolonged power outages.  
 
Research Questions 
There were two main research objectives for this study.  The first question:  “what 
vulnerabilities exist at Air Force installations for future power outages?”  The calculated 
level at each installation provides a score based on different components of historical 
power outages.  These vulnerability scores serve as the basis to address the second 
question:  “how can these vulnerabilities be reduced at the installations?”  These research 
questions focused on the individual components of power outages and their implications 
to Air Force installations.  The findings will help installations address concerns with 
supplied power and provide a basis for the Air Force to assess their available generation 
assets and power generation strategy. 
 
Methodology 
This study focuses on trend analysis of power outages throughout the U.S. based 
on reported power outage data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA).  Data 
for this study was collected from the EIA’s major disturbances and unusual occurrences 
database which contains information about reported power outages from January 2000 to 
September 2009.  Of particular interest in this database is information regarding power 
outages relating to the responsible power company, duration, location, power loss, cause, 
and number of people affected.  The database was initially reviewed for errors and then 
geographic orientation was added to each data point for use within GIS.  The software 
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being utilized, ArcGIS, is offered by the Environmental Systems Research Institute, Inc. 
(ESRI).  ArcGIS contains the Spatial Analyst Tools necessary to perform the analysis.   
The EIA’s power outage database was inputted into ArcGIS and analyzed using 
the inverse distance weighted (IDW) approach to interpolate the values between known 
points based on distance and weighted values.  IDW was performed for each of the 
components identified above, resulting in separate maps for power outage duration, 
power loss, and number of people affected.  Utilizing the raster calculator in ArcGIS, the 
three maps were consolidated into a single output showing overall vulnerability levels.  
From this map, assessments can be made regarding which bases are more vulnerable to 
power outages caused by failing transmission equipment. 
 
Assumptions 
There were four primary assumptions that needed to be made in order to perform 
the analysis for this research.  First, it is assumed that the EIA power outage data could 
be generalized within each region.  Since the EIA data lacked exact coordinates of the 
power failure or the specifics regarding the customers affected, it was assumed that 
power outages were central to each power company’s service area and uniformly affected 
customers from the center of the service area outwards.  Second, it is assumed that the 
past trends of power failures are in fact good predictors of future occurrences, even 
considering the major improvements being made to the electric grid.  Third, it is assumed 
that all power companies provide reports on identical types of power outages, making the 
data collected uniform across the U.S.  Last, despite inherent differences between 
environmental conditions, operating conditions, and missions at bases across the Air 
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Force, the findings and recommendations developed during this study were assumed 
applicable to all installations. 
 
Limitations 
The primary limitation affecting the research was the fact that all of the data being 
utilized is second-hand from government agencies.  As a result, there are a limited 
number of data points which can be used with no opportunity to get additional data.  In 
particular, the exact origin of and exact customers affected by power outages is lacking 
within the databases, so each data point must be generalized to each utility company 
region and the affected customers.  This is not only an assumption but also a limitation 
since the EIA requires this information to be reported immediately following an outage, 
yet the information is not available to the public.  This limitation affects the overall IDW 
calculations since the analysis uses distances; with data points overlapping, the output is 
slightly skewed towards areas with higher numbers of outages.  The final limitation is the 
lack of previous research using IDW and the raster calculator in ArcGIS as a means to 
verify the calculated information.   
 
Significance of Study 
It is anticipated that this study will alert Air Force leadership to installations that 
are increasingly vulnerable to power outages.  Included within this finding will be 
statistics based on the overall type and duration of typical power outages within areas 
surrounding Air Force installations.  This study builds upon previous studies pertaining to 
energy management by creating a tool to adequately understand the service provided by 
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electric companies.  The results from this study can be generalized to other defense 
branches and also large-scale industrial/commercial business such that they can take 
action to minimize affects from future power outages.  This study helps the Air Force 
assess available assets and provides a solid foundation for transforming current energy 
management practices to ensure the Air Force mission is maintained during outages. 
  
Organization of Remaining Chapters 
Following this introductory chapter, there are four additional chapters to this 
thesis.  The second chapter consists of a literature review that covers various topics 
relevant to power sustainment and reliability.  The third chapter is a detailed overview of 
the methodology for the study, to include data collection, GIS overview, and risk 
assessment model construction.  Results and discussions are presented in the fourth 
chapter, which explains all the findings from the GIS data analysis and provides a 
detailed description of each focus area from the model.  The final chapter serves as a 
conclusion to the study and reviews all important details from the entire thesis process. 
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Chapter 2.  Literature Review 
 
 The purpose of the literature review was to identify and analyze documents 
containing information relevant to the nation’s bulk power system and the impact of 
associated vulnerabilities on Air Force operations.  The bulk power system, or national 
grid, is continually evolving with some of the larger changes occurring in regulation over 
the past few decades (Apt, Lave, & Morgan, 2006).  This includes the stressing of 
existing power lines to meet demand increases which have resulted in numerous power 
outages.  However, these fluctuations have initiated a transformation to modernize the 
power grid to meet current and future needs.  Efforts such as deregulation and the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) were efforts to revolutionize the electric grid.  
Mitigation efforts at the consumer level have been a step in the right direction, yet 
concerns still exist regarding the advancement of technology and future demands of the 
electric grid.  To this point, many researchers have focused on the statistical analysis of 
power outages for trends relating to the duration and cause of the outage.  The utilization 
of geographic information systems (GIS) to perform the analysis allows proximity to 
outages to be considered.  
 
Evolution of the Bulk Power System 
The nation’s bulk power system, also known as the United States (U.S.) electric 
grid, is a massively interconnected web of power lines supplying electricity across the 
U.S. and Canada.  Initially designed as vertical delivery systems with single companies 
being responsible for generation, transmission, and distribution as shown in Figure 1, the 
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system has been transformed such that power now flows from the generator to the end-
user through nearly unlimited paths.   
 
 
  
Figure 1.  Nation’s Power Grid Physical Structure (About NERC, 2010) 
 
Defining the Nation’s Power Grid 
The national electric grid achieves power delivery by more than 3,100 electric 
utilities through three grids with limited interconnections (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2007).  The combination of existing transmission lines and other equipment 
being more than 25 years old, there is reduced reliability in multiple regions of the 
national electric grid.  Lower reliability often results in power interruptions in the form of 
a brownout or a blackout.  A blackout represents an instance of complete power loss, 
while a brownout typically describes momentary fluctuations in voltage.  Within these 
two types of power fluctuations are both short-term and long-term events, which 
encompass the reliability of supply, quality of power offered, and provision of 
information (Arrillaga et al., 2000).   
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Power reliability addresses all voltage changes and power losses due to 
complications within the electric grid.  Since 1984, an average of 700,000 customers have 
been affected annually by power outages (Amin, 2005).  In an effort to curb the rising 
concerns regarding power reliability, an increased focus on stability and security has been 
aimed at improving the nation’s electric grid (Anjia, Jiaxi, & Zhizhong, 2006).  However, 
one of the immediate obstacles to overcome with the existing electric grid is that most of 
the equipment is more than 25 years old.  As electricity usage continues to grow, the 
reserve margin decreases on the existing power lines and increases the chance for future 
power failures (Mili et al., 2004; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007; Brown, 
2005).  Over time, the electrical equipment loses the ability to transport its original design 
load due to deterioration, thus making it less able to handle increasing consumer 
demands.  Operating power lines close to their reserve margin increases the stress on the 
lines, thereby reducing their safety factor and making the lines more susceptible to 
failing. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007; Brown, 2005) 
One of the most prominent power problems, as identified by experts, are 
momentary voltage sags (Arrillaga et al., 2000).  These momentary sags are extremely 
problematic for larger industrial and commercial consumers who have a low tolerance for 
power fluctuations in which any change can shut down business operations for an 
extended period of time.  This idea follows the ‘first-law’ efficiency created by Ayres et 
al. (2005) which refers to the ratio of useful outputs to inputs.  In particular, the 
consumer’s requirement for consistent power (output) is much more valuable to them 
than the money they pay for it (input), as it multiplies their ability to make additional 
money.  In addition to momentary power sags, large-scale blackouts are extremely 
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problematic for consumers and unfortunately have become more frequent in recent years 
(Mili et al., 2004).  Some researchers (e.g., Mili et al., 2004; Eto & LaCommare, 2008) 
feel the increasing number of large-scale blackouts is a direct result of the transmission of 
power over long distances on a grid that was not designed for it.  Complicating matters 
further, the capacity for improvements and expansions to the electric grid is severely 
limited by costs. 
 
Power Fluctuation Implications 
 Prior research has aimed at investigating the different components of power 
fluctuations as well as identifying rising concerns within the U.S. electric grid.  In 
particular, momentary power fluctuations (less than five minutes in duration) have a 
greater impact on organizations than larger, less frequent events.  Unfortunately, utility 
companies are not required to report minor events to federal agencies (LaCommare & 
Eto, 2004).  However, under certain circumstances, these small outages can domino into 
a much larger event that affects a wider range of consumers (Dobson, 2007).   
LaCommare and Eto (2004) determined that the costs associated with power 
fluctuations tend to be driven by frequency rather than duration, with momentary outages 
accounting for nearly two-thirds of the overall cost to the U.S.  Annually, these costs 
have been determined to range between $22 and $135 billion (LaCommare & Eto, 2004).  
However, the incurred losses to businesses is not directly proportional to the duration of 
the power fluctuation (LaCommare & Eto, 2004; Hines, Apt, & Talukdar, 2008); in other 
words, longer duration outages may not necessarily result in the highest monetary losses.  
The main reason for this difference is the result of businesses’ ability to adapt to the lack 
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of power as the outage continues.  Therefore, losses incurred later in an event do not have 
the same impact as those at the beginning of the event.  Concerning this large cost of 
power outages, Brown (2005) estimated that for every dollar of lost electricity sales, costs 
incurred by businesses exceeded more than $100.  Building on this idea, electricity can be 
thought of as a multiplier where more revenue is made than spent on electricity when 
power is on; however, when electricity is off, additional money must be spent to pay for 
workers while productivity is low.  This does not take into consideration special 
organizations, such as the DoD, where mission degradation is more critical than monetary 
losses and can have far greater consequences.   
 
Recent Power Fluctuation Examples 
Power outages throughout the last 50 years have identified major concerns within 
the power grid regarding reliability and power quality.  Investigations of both the 1965 
cascading blackout of the Northeastern U.S. and the 2003 cascading blackout that also 
darkened the Northeastern U.S. have revealed key problem areas with the nation’s 
electric grid.  In particular, the results from the two events revealed both human error and 
a need for better communication between power areas.  Both areas need to be addressed 
to improve system reliability.  With each major power fluctuation, additional research is 
undertaken to better understand and prevent future outages (Brown, 2005; Abshier, 
2007).  Although interest regarding power fluctuations has increased, some researchers 
feel as though power failures are “nearly an unavoidable product of a collision between 
the physics of the system and the economic rules that now regulate them” (Lerner, 2003).  
The inability to successfully prevent power outages is a direct result of unexpected 
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events, lack of system understanding, inadequate feedback controls, poor maintenance, 
and operator error (Hauer & Dagle, 1999).   
The past 50 years is full of large-scale power outages, to include cascading power 
outages which are among the most problematic.  Some of the more memorable power 
outages in recent years have been the blackouts in the western part of the U.S. in 1996, 
the rolling blackouts experienced in California in the summer of 2001, and the cascading 
blackout that plagued the northeastern U.S. and Canada in August 2003 (Hauer & Dagle, 
1999; Mili et al., 2004; Apt et al., 2006; Lerner, 2003; Amin, 2005).  From the available 
research (Ayres et al., 2005; EIA, 2009; Hauer & Dagle, 1999), Figure 2 was created to 
provide a visual representation of major power outages and the resulting regulatory 
efforts.  Each of these events affected more than a local community, and they also 
represented many of the reasons for power fluctuations identified by Hauer & Dagle 
(1999).   
The western U.S., especially California, has experienced its fair share of power 
reliability issues within the past 20 years.  In July of 1996, one instance of power failure 
left 2.2 million California residents without power (Mili et al., 2004).  In 2001, California 
experienced outages similar to those in 1996; however, with the increasing population 
growth, the effects were much larger and farther reaching.  The resulting shortage of 
power forced utility companies to initiate rolling blackouts such that blackouts were 
intermittently shared across the whole area until sufficient power could be generated and 
transmitted to the consumers (Amin, 2005; Apt et al., 2006).  The last major power 
fluctuation to discuss affected more than 50 million people, both within the U.S. and 
Canada.  The northeast blackout in 2003 was the most widespread and largest blackout in  
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history and was caused by numerous problems with failure to adhere to suggested 
regulations (Lerner, 2003; Amin, 2005).  The initial cause of the blackout was determined 
to be human error and failure to properly trim trees around high-voltage power lines.  
Power ultimately failed when a sagging high voltage transmission line grounded on an 
overgrown tree, resulting in a domino effect of system failures throughout the northeast.  
Completed investigations of outage causes often identify areas needing improvement and 
ways to mitigate similar problems in the future.  
 
Findings from the Identified Power Fluctuations 
Investigations following large power fluctuations are among the best ways to 
identify causes, examine total effects, and recommend solutions to prevent the problems 
from occurring in the future.  As with most technology today, 99.9 percent reliability is 
increasingly unacceptable and can prove disastrous in the digital world (Amin, 2005; 
Blankinship, 2001).  Monetary losses are not the only effects felt by individuals from the 
loss of power; in fact, public health and safety, institutions, and national security are all 
affected by power loss and people’s lives and well-being can become severely 
jeopardized (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007).  Bearing that in mind, 
finding ways to avoid and minimize the spread of power outages is important for the 
smooth operation of today’s society.  
Among the different types of power outages, cascading are the most devastating 
type as a single event can trigger a series of failures resulting in widespread blackouts.  
Studies have found that there are two main types of cascading outages:  an outage started 
by a node removal or one that is started by an edge removal (Chassin & Posse, 2005; De 
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la Ree, Liu, Mili, Phadke, & DaSilva, 2005).  An example of a node removal would be 
the malfunction of a transformer or substation which receives electricity from one 
direction and sends it out along multiple paths.  The second type, edge removal, can be as 
simple as the loss of a single power line that carries current from one point to another.   
Additionally, hidden failures can be the most troublesome since they are 
permanent defects that only become evident during a failure and often times create larger, 
more immediate problems (De la Ree et al., 2005).  There is a general belief that paying 
for reliable electricity should eliminate any type of power interruption (Brayley, Redfern, 
& Bo, 2005).  However, previous research has found that reliability has not improved as 
electricity prices have increased, which is contrary to the desires of the consumer (Apt et 
al., 2006; Hines et al., 2008).  The 2003 blackout was initially started by the loss of a 
single transmission line (edge removal) which caused other sections of the grid to 
overload and shut down (node removal).  These two types of power failures are not 
mutually exclusive but can be initiated as a result of the other.  What sometimes may be 
thought of as a minor outage, can sometimes escalate into a much larger effect, over a 
much larger area. 
While blackouts have not shown a significant increase or decrease within the past 
two decades, there appear to be trends that show a higher number of power outages 
during the summer and winter months and also during mid-afternoon hours (Hines et al., 
2008).  Currently, there is dissent with who is responsible for mitigating blackout 
concerns and the best way to remedy the situation since no single entity manages 
electricity from generation to the consumer.  Specifically, with a decentralized system, 
everyone is interested in their own assets, making it difficult for one organization to be 
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blamed and held responsible for fixing the problems with the electric grid (Fox-Penner, 
2005).   
If no immediate actions are made to voluntarily increase the electric grid 
reliability, the next major power failure could force power companies to make significant 
improvements under a shortened timeline and at extremely high prices.  As described by 
Dobson (2007), “blackouts cause reliability.”  Sometimes, it takes a larger power outage 
to initiate needed reform once the consequences are observed, as opposed to being 
preventative in nature. 
 
Mitigation Efforts 
Electricity has become a necessity in today’s society.  This is becoming more and 
more evident as each power outage brings some portion of society to a halt.  As a result, 
efforts at both the federal and local levels are being undertaken to reduce the overall 
number of power fluctuations and increase overall power reliability. 
 
Regulatory Evolution 
In Amin’s (2005) study, the North American electric grid was referred to as the 
“most complex machine ever built.”  Within this structure are three components 
responsible for connecting generation facilities to the actual consumer:  (1) transmission 
level, (2) sub-transmission level, and (3) distribution level (Baker, 2008).  The 
transmission level includes extra high voltage lines to transport electricity from the power 
plants to electrical substations.  Sub-transmission lines connect to the substations and 
transport power to high voltage end-users such as manufacturing facilities or plants.  
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Lastly, distribution lines disseminate power to end-users through low-voltage power 
lines.  Contrary to common belief, power does not move automatically through the bulk 
power system; it takes a concerted effort by the utility companies.  According to 
McDonald (2008), utility companies have four main responsibilities to consumers:  1) 
provide reliable electricity, 2) create a secure operating environment, 3) ensure continuity 
for businesses, and 4) design plans for disaster preparedness and emergency management 
response.  Each of these components ensures power is present to consumers over 99% of 
the time (Blankinship, 2001).   
 
Involved Regulatory Organizations 
Under the electric grid’s regulated structure, power is regulated by the FERC to 
ensure the nation’s interstate transmission system operates efficiently while sub-agencies, 
controlled by the state regulatory commissions, regulate the distribution system (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2007).  The addition of long-range transmission lines 
connecting different geographic areas began creating problems with reliability and power 
quality as they eventually became bottlenecks for power running long distances while 
operating near maximum capacity.    
In 1962, ten regional reliability councils, as shown in Figure 3, were established 
to plan and coordinate generation and transmission in their regional areas (Apt et al., 
2006).  Following the 1965 blackout in the Northeastern U.S., there was an apparent need 
for additional oversight beyond what the regional reliability councils and FERC were 
capable.  As a result, the NERC was created to help reduce the risk of widespread electric 
system failures by creating standards to improve compliance by electric utilities (Chassin 
 
 
23 
 
& Posse, 2005; Lerner, 2003).  Almost immediately, it became apparent that the 
standards created by the NERC would face significant resistance because NERC was a 
non-profit organization with no direct way to enforce the established standards, thereby 
making compliance with their standards voluntary (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2007; Brown, 2005).   
 
 
 
Figure 3.  NERC Regional Reliability Councils (About NERC, 2010) 
 
In an effort to increase power reliability, FERC intended to break apart the 
monopolies that utility companies managed within the deregulated power structure.  
Consistent with FERC’s mission of “reliable, efficient and sustainable energy for 
customers,” they planned to create a market economy where power was traded as a 
commodity.  It was anticipated that by FERC enforcing deregulation, power being traded 
as a commodity would result in lower costs and more reliable power to the end-user.  
With the passing of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) in 1978, 
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wholesale competition was on the upturn, which was the first step towards a market 
economy (Brown, 2005).  PURPA essentially regulated the rates such that it was more 
beneficial for electric utilities to buy power as opposed to making it.   
The passing of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 92) authorized the FERC to 
break apart the vertical monopolies observed within the regulated electric grid.  
Following EPAct 92, it took until 1996 to write the directives in FERC Order 888 which 
allowed transmission line access to any generation facility (Baker, 2008; Lerner, 2003).  
This broke apart vertical monopolies and allowed generation facilities to transmit their 
power over any number of transmission lines.  Figure 4 shows a visual representation of 
how power can be moved from the power plants to the consumer.  This is contrary to 
what was shown earlier in Figure 1 where a single power company was responsible for 
generating, transmitting, and distributing power to the consumer. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Post Deregulation Power System 
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Attempted Deregulation and Results 
Deregulation within the power grid exacerbated existing problems and brought 
additional ones to the forefront.  Restructuring has resulted in a rapid rate of wholesale 
market expansion and a large variability in electricity prices among states (Mili et al., 
2004; Brown, 2005), sometimes without any apparent justification.  Deregulation has also 
resulted in decreased line reserve margins (extra capacity on power lines during normal 
usage), redundancy, and quantity of spare parts while further increasing dependence on 
transmission lines (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007).  In addition, 
underinvestment in the electric supply infrastructure causes vulnerability within the 
overcomplicated system to continue to rise as power is transported over longer distances 
and results in more voltage sags (Anjia et al., 2006; Arrillaga et al., 2000; Baker, 2008).  
These concerns undermine the motivation for today’s deregulated environment which 
was “to create a stable state able to withstand exogenous events and profitably deliver 
power to consumers” (Baker, 2008, p. 4). 
Currently, only a limited number of states are currently operating the electric grid 
with a deregulated system.  The guidance provided by the FERC passed the responsibility 
for the electric grid to the states such that they could make a decision regarding their 
power structure.  This allowed the states to determine whether or not it would be within 
their best interests to deregulate their power structure or maintain control.  Figure 5 
displays the 50 states and structuring within each state.  States identified as “Active” 
currently have a deregulated electricity system.  Areas identified as “Suspended” have 
attempted deregulation but stopped after a multitude of complications occurred while the 
remainder of the states are operating in a state regulated system. 
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Figure 5.  Current Status of Electricity Restructuring (EIA, 2009) 
 
Factors Affecting Reliability 
Whether investigating a regulated or deregulated grid, certain factors exist that 
complicate concerns regarding the reliability and quality of power being delivered.  For 
instance, increased demand is stressing the grid and creating additional strain for which 
the system was not designed.  About one-half of all domestic generation is sold and 
delivered over the stressed transmission lines (Baker, 2008; Albert, Albert, & Nakarado, 
2004); therefore, unless changes are made, reliability and quality will continue to suffer.  
Compounding the effects of the additional stress on the grid, dependability is often 
favored at the expense of security (Mili et al., 2004).  As shown in Figure 6, money spent 
on the electric grid since 1996 has been insufficient to cover the depreciation of the 
existing equipment.  As a result, electric companies have invested to improve reliability 
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by upgrading existing lines but have done little to protect against physical and cyber 
problems.  In addition, electric companies have opted to use otherwise vacant 
transmission lines intended to provide necessary redundancy as opposed to expanding 
current capacity.   
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Electric Grid Investment vs. Depreciation (Amin, 2005) 
 
From a consumer perspective, all the changes occurring within the national power 
grid have a direct effect on not only the power supplied but also the cost for the new and 
improved power.  Improvements will more than likely require either increases in utility 
rates or government subsidies, which come from taxpayers.  In conjunction with the rapid 
deregulation, there has been a large decrease in new incentives to improve system 
capacity, thereby making it difficult to market and implement technological advances 
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(Hauer & Dagle, 1999; Baker, 2008).  As a result, utility companies rely on the existing 
infrastructure until an outage occurs and use the outage to identify both the 
underinvestment and problems with the aging power grid (Fox-Penner, 2005).   
Anjia et al. (2006) identified five threats affecting power grid reliability and 
quality:  (1) investment in power grid is insufficient, (2) impact of power industry 
restructuring and the lack of sole responsibility for grid reliability, (3) tendency for 
owners and operators to focus on a short-term, least-expensive operation approaches, (4) 
cyber threats and physical threats of the grid, and (5) natural disasters and terrorism 
threats.  As mentioned earlier, deregulation favored utility companies using the existing 
infrastructure as opposed to investing in new equipment.  This essentially created a 
decentralized web of blame as to who is responsible during outage events:  are generation 
companies responsible for power issues or the transmission companies that transport the 
power?  Similarly, companies are reluctant to spend money on long-term investments 
because they are focused on handling immediate issues.  However, as few improvements 
are made to the existing system, the susceptibility to physical and cyber threats 
continually increases (Mili et al., 2004; Bruce, 2002). (Bruce, 2002).   
One of the major concerns regarding mitigation efforts of power fluctuations is 
the idea that not enough is being done to secure the nation’s future energy needs.  
Looking back at the regulatory changes within the electric grid, they have mainly focused 
on widespread changes lacking specific guidelines as to what needs to be addressed.  
Unfortunately, these changes must be made on such a large scale that complete 
understanding and acceptance of what needs to be completed might be difficult.  As a 
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result, focused mitigation efforts need to be made to reduce the system deterioration and 
force electric companies to abide by national guidelines. 
 
National Level Mitigation Efforts 
The literature tends to point to the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) as a 
turning point when national attention was brought to bear on the electric grid’s problems 
and a path was officially developed to help mitigate future problems (McDonald, 2008; 
Abshier, 2007).  According to the EPAct 2005, Congress delegated the authority to 
approve and enforce rules affecting the reliability of the nation’s bulk power system to 
the FERC in an effort to increase the reliability within the nation’s electric grid 
(McDonald, 2008).  As a result, the FERC certified the NERC as the Electric Reliability 
Organization (ERO) providing full control for creating and enforcing reliability standards 
for the nation’s bulk power system (Abshier, 2007).  This newly appointed power 
provided the NERC the ability to create standards and enforce policy affecting power 
reliability of the different regional entities.  As shown in Figure 7, the different NERC 
regions cover a wide range of varying sizes with each having a completely different 
population set.  Prior to 2005, little effort was being expended within the nation’s bulk 
power system to improve reliability since no single organization wielded the power to 
enforce the developed standards. 
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NERC REGION 
Total Size 
(Square miles) 
Peak Demand 
Number of 
Customers      
(U.S. & Canada) 
Florida Reliability Coordination 
Council (FRCC) 
~ 50,000 45,734 MW ~ 16,000,000 
Midwest Reliability Organization 
(MRO) 
~ 1,000,000 50,575 MW ~ 20,000,000 
Northeast Power Coordinating 
Council (NPCC) 
~ 1,200,000 109,798 MW ~ 55,000,000 
ReliabilityFirst Corporation (RFC) ~ 238,000 178,100 MW ~ 72,000,000 
SERC Reliability 
Corporation (SERC) 
~ 560,000 202,738 MW ~ 68,000,000 
Southwest Power Pool (SPP) ~ 370,000 44,463 MW ~ 5,000,000 
Texas Regional Entity (TRE) ~ 200,000 63,491 MW ~ 22,000,000 
Western Electricity Coordinating 
Council (WECC) 
~ 1,760,000 160,688 MW ~ 71,000,000 
 
Figure 7.  Power Outages by NERC Region (EIA, 2009) 
 
Prior to 2005, oversight of the nation’s bulk power system was comprised of 
voluntary organizations lacking authority to enforce any “suggested” reliability standards 
(Abshier, 2007).  Adherence to the developed standards were up to individual power 
companies and violations went unpunished.  Among the most problematic areas with the 
electric grid is identifying who is responsible for bearing the costs to increase system 
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reliability.  One main area of concern is deciding how to estimate expenses needed for 
improving the system.  Brown (2005) estimated that improvements could cost as much as 
$150 billion with little understanding as to who would be responsible for this tremendous 
burden since companies were only responsible for a small section of the electric grid.   
One major downfall of deregulation resulted in utility companies having little 
desire to expand the system while operating existing lines closer to their capacity to 
maximize their economic benefit (Arrillaga et al., 2000).  Additionally, the existing 
regional regulatory councils were more effective at responding to power issues as 
opposed to managing the risks that preceded it (Hauer & Dagle, 1999).  One final area of 
concern that developed prior to 2005 was the need to strengthen the nation’s bulk power 
system and the development of an improved response plan (Bruce, 2002).   
EPAct 2005 created many ripples within the bulk electric system as the grid’s 
mandatory reliability standards were developed within the NERC’s Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (CIP) standards (Abshier, 2007; McDonald, 2008).   These standards required 
utility companies to take responsibility for their areas of the bulk electric systems in 
North America or risk heavy fines until compliance was achieved.  One of the CIP 
standards required utility companies to identify and protect critical cyber assets 
responsible for controlling the reliability of the whole system (McDonald, 2008).  In 
development for about three years, the CIP standards went beyond any existing guidance 
and focused on both security and cyber issues in preparation for possible future problems 
with the electric grid (McDonald, 2008; McClelland, 2009). 
Initially, the NERC struggled to define what is actually considered critical 
infrastructure but eventually came up with the following definition: “CIP includes 
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facilities, systems and equipment which, if destroyed, degraded or otherwise rendered 
unavailable, would affect the reliability or operability of the bulk electric system” 
(McClelland, 2009).  As defined by the NERC, this definition leaves room for 
interpretation by utility companies regarding the actual definition of critical 
infrastructure.  Since the bulk power system is constantly changing, the application of the 
new standards will limit flexibility and the ability to act decisively in case of an 
emergency (McClelland, 2009).  Finally, the standards that are being created do not 
always tie directly into issues that are seen across the whole system and this can create 
issues with enforcing standards if they are not necessarily applicable to each area (Shaw, 
2009).   
Looking beyond the problems with the CIP standards and the surrounding grid, 
there appears to be some problems with the standards themselves.  In particular, many of 
the standards contained vague guidance which left a lot of room for utility companies to 
interpret what they were actually required to do.  If an asset is deemed critical in the 
middle of assessments, no additional time is allotted to rectify the situation and bring the 
asset into compliance (Mertz, 2008; McClelland, 2009).  One area that the NERC left 
extremely vague is describing “how” companies are to ensure compliance with the 
standards.   This vagueness creates much uncertainty when companies are trying to 
adhere to the defined standards as they will be audited for compliance by NERC 
according to their internal definition.  These issues have raised additional concerns within 
the electric grid and have resulted in less-than-acceptable actions. 
Once the NERC released the CIP standards and dictated their timeline for 
compliance, it was apparent little time was built into the schedule to reassess a 
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company’s assets to determine their criticality.  This in turn put a strain on the utility 
companies to strive merely for compliance at the cost of possibly failing to adequately 
secure their systems (Mertz, 2008).  As a result, many utility companies are under-
reporting the number of critical assets that they own either through a failure to 
acknowledge a component’s importance or intentionally calling it “non-critical” to avoid 
future actions (Bradbury, 2009; Shaw, 2009).  However, even though problems with 
reliability of the nation’s bulk power system are being addressed at the national level, 
there is an opportunity for consumers to protect their own investments and actually 
decrease their likelihood of being effected by new and recurring power fluctuations. 
 
Local Level Mitigation Efforts 
Whereas mitigation efforts at the national level can be expensive and difficult to 
coordinate, local efforts can be much less expensive and easier to implement.  As with 
most mitigation attempts, efforts are made to improve the system such that a fast 
response can occur to prevent the cascading effects of power fluctuations and better 
isolate problems (Amin, 2005).  Consumers often feel they must protect their own assets 
and invest in a wide range of technologies to help reduce their vulnerability to power 
fluctuations.  Items such as surge protectors, stand-by generators, or even battery backup 
systems are all tools that help minimize the effects due to unforeseen power events.  As 
noted by LaCommare and Eto (2004), upwards of 3 cents of every manufacturing dollar 
was spent annually on industrial equipment to address power fluctuation issues.  
However, simply trying to mask the problem with a small-scale solution might not work 
in the near-to-mid future (Masse et al., 2007).   
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If a company relies solely on backup generators to power their facilities during 
blackouts, unforeseen problems may arise regarding maintenance and continued 
operations.  For instance, a shortage of fuel or trained maintenance personnel might result 
in a business being unable to supply their own power as they had only planned for short-
duration outages.  As a result, unknown external factors often alter an organization’s 
plans, making it nearly impossible to be completely prepared for an unknown event with 
an undetermined duration.   
Although it is extremely difficult to plan for a completely new problem, 
organizations can perform vulnerability assessments to determine where potential 
weaknesses may exist within their current operations.  Specifically, if a power fluctuation 
were to occur from an outside source, how would it affect operations inside the company 
and their customers?  Once the results from the event are thoroughly understood, steps 
must be taken to reduce associated risk, identify possible failing areas, develop the 
response to the incident, and standardize the operating procedures (Anjia et al., 2006). 
Instead of passively waiting for the utility companies to restore the grid, the DoD 
has been developing detailed plans regarding procedures to be used during power 
outages.  The DoD, the nation’s largest single consumer of power, has a critical mission 
that cannot wait for utility companies to restore power.  As a result, backup plans exist 
regarding power restoration to their critical infrastructure.  Plans creating additional 
power production capability have been initiated at multiple locations across the U.S., 
thereby allowing installations to isolate themselves from the grid through self-
sustainment during instances of prolonged power outages.  For instance, renewable 
energy sources (i.e., geothermal, photovoltaic, and wind) and dedicated fossil fuel 
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combustion plants are under construction, or have been completed, to provide sufficient 
backup for installations during commercial blackouts (Aimone, 2009).  Unfortunately 
though, massive power generation support is not always economically feasible at all 
locations.  Therefore, installations must look at a smaller scale and their internal 
capabilities to determine the best course of action that is both feasible and economically 
beneficial. 
 
Future Concerns 
One of the most difficult areas to plan for regarding the power grid is the 
uncertainty behind the demand for future power and any associated requirements.  Within 
the near future, external threats, fuel supply-line issues, and the possibility of cascading 
failures will continue to be prominent and must have their needs adequately addressed.  
External threats to the bulk power system, such as terrorists or natural disasters, are often 
regarded as being able to bring down multiple areas of the system at one time (Amin, 
2005).  Although there is not a known successful attack by a terrorist on the power 
system, the potential exists for multiple node failures resulting in widespread outages of 
an unknown duration (Anjia et al., 2006).  Natural disasters are another area that will 
remain a large concern as the power system will be continuously tested by hurricanes, 
tornadoes, earthquakes, and various weather events; additionally, scientists are also 
becoming increasingly worried about the possible negative effects due to solar flares 
from the sun.  A severe solar flare has the possibility to not only bring down large areas 
of the power system, but it can physically destroy transformers and other conductors due 
to the large amount of induced current (McClelland, 2009).  The effects from such a large 
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storm could last for weeks or longer since equipment would almost surely need 
replacement due to permanent damage from the storm.   
The possibility exists for prolonged power outages and only recently have these 
concerns been brought to the forefront.  Another future concern for the power grid is the 
availability of a constant stream of fossil fuels required to run the generators powering 
the U.S.  Although most generators are operating from coal mined in the U.S., the 
possibility exists for a break in the supply line.  Such an event would have far reaching 
effects, possibly requiring other plants to produce additional power until the offline plants 
could be restored (Umstattd, 2009).  The final area that is still a concern for the future is 
the possibility for more cascading power failures.  It is unclear whether the NERC’s CIP 
standards will decrease the possibility of cascading failures because major improvements 
are needed to the power system as the effects from these fluctuations have such a 
dramatic impact on our way of life (Watts, 2003).   
 
Geographic Information Systems Analysis 
Little research is available regarding GIS analysis and the electric grid.  However, 
within the past few years, the implementation of GIS as a method to analyze geospatially 
referenced data has become increasingly popular; specifically, the importance of 
analyzing spatial relationships between events and the corresponding system has become 
apparent.  This gives researchers tools to analyze more than point masses on a map while 
allowing flexibility to determine intermediate values. 
Uses for GIS typically include mapping some sort of geospatial and nongeospatial 
data such that a visual representation of  the data can be created (Shih et al., 2009).  This 
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provides a good visual representation of the information’s specific locations in order to 
assess spatial relationships.  Tools often used within ArcGIS for analyzing point data 
typically rely on interpolation through one or more of the following common methods:  
inverse distance weighted (IDW), splining, or kriging.  Three studies in recent years have 
investigated the implementation of ArcGIS and the different tools to analyze the available 
information (Shih et al., 2009; Earls and Dixon, 2007; Karydas, Gitas, Koutsogiannaki, 
Lydakis-Simantiris, & Silleos, 2009).  The work by Earls and Dixon (2007) used 
interpolation of rainfall to determine a more accurate representation through the use of 
IDW, splining, and kriging.  Karydas et al. (2009) utilized interpolation to map the 
topsoil characteristics within Crete.  Lastly, Shih et al. (2009) investigated coal mine 
disruptions to U.S. power generation facilities through the interpolation of available data.   
The Earls and Dixon (2007) study intended to evaluate the different spatial 
interpolation techniques (splining, inverse distance weighting, kriging) to determine if 
one type was better for analyzing the available rain data for Charlie Creek, Florida.  
Varying different parameters within the respective tools resulted in interpolated values of 
varying accuracy when compared to the actual recorded data.  However, for this 
particular study, it was determined that kriging was the best alternative since the contours 
followed the actual data more closely and did not lose small data points like the other 
tools.  Similarly, Karydas et al. (2009) investigated different interpolation tools, but 
focused specifically on five common topsoil properties.  In contrast to Earls and Dixon, 
no specific interpolation tool was determined to be better over another since the provided 
soil data did not demonstrate continuous trends.  It was determined that fragmentation of 
the land and availability of data points resulted in no tool being better than another.  As a 
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result, each study will have a specific tool that matches the dataset closely and it must be 
analyzed to determine which tool is best in different situations. 
The final study, Shih et al. (2009) went a step further than the two previous 
studies by actually mapping the different components necessary to supply coal to power 
plants and analyzed how an earthquake can have far-reaching effects.  In fact, this study 
merged geospatial and nongeospatial data such that a model could be created showing the 
potential impacts of a disruption to one or more areas.  This visual representation may not 
identify specific causes and effects, but it helps estimate the potential impacts of a supply 
shortage, due to an earthquake in this case, on power plants.  In each of these studies, it is 
important to realize that interpolation is a technique being used by more and more 
researchers to analyze nongeospatial and geospatial data.  However, depending on the 
intent of the analysis, the interpolation tool will vary. 
 
Management of Vulnerability  
No matter the mitigation efforts at the national level, some level of vulnerability 
for power fluctuations will always exist and it is up to the end-user to create adequate 
management programs.  As discussed in the previous section, EPAct 2005 is a step in the 
right direction for improving the national power system.  Unfortunately, it is anticipated 
that changes will take an extended amount of time to implement and may need revisions 
due to ever changing technology.  In the meantime, vulnerability can be assessed and 
managed at the user level such that some responsibility can be removed from the electric 
companies and placed on the consumers.  This in turn will make consumers better 
prepared for future power fluctuations that might affect their operations.  
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Vulnerability Defined 
Whereas Merriam-Webster (2009) defines vulnerability as “open to attack or 
damage,” there is much more involved when trying to understand the different intricacies 
during power outages.  When there is a loss within the nation’s power grid, there can 
either be a partial loss in voltage (sag) or a complete loss of power resulting in a blackout 
(or brownout).  Most of the areas discussed thus far have been about complete blackouts, 
yet the potential for power sags still exists and must also be addressed.  The vulnerability 
of the electric grid can be interpreted as the overall exposure that exists regarding an 
attack on the electric grid (LaCommare & Eto, 2004).  In recent years, the electric grid 
has become increasingly vulnerable to physical attacks or even overloading of existing 
power lines as reinvestment in the electric grid has been low (Mili et al., 2004).  
However, adequate management of these vulnerabilities can help sustain mission 
operations even during times of power fluctuations. 
 
Vulnerability Assessment and Management 
After determining the associated vulnerabilities throughout the power grid, it is 
important to determine the specific level associated to the end-user.  According to Anjia 
et al., (2006), the purpose of a vulnerability assessment is to determine when a disruption 
of service is likely to occur, take steps to reduce the associated risk, identify weak parts, 
develop the response to the incident, enhance operator’s awareness, and standardize the 
operation procedures.  A vulnerability assessment can be performed in a number of 
different ways to include the analysis of historical trends regarding outages and their 
overall affects.  The remainder of the steps identified by Anjia et al. (2006) are dependent 
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upon the situation and the available resources that locations have to help mitigate the 
overall vulnerability.  In fact, the USAF Infrastructure Energy Strategy (2008) mentions 
specifics regarding the DoD’s vulnerability of power fluctuations at Air Force 
installations. 
Risk to critical missions at installations is a site-specific problem that is 
being studied within the Air Force in concert with DoD, the DHS, and the 
DOE, but the different parts of the problem are not yet integrated into a 
comprehensive “get well” plan. We can reduce some of this mission risk 
through conservation and expanded site-generated renewable energy. A 
number of steps are required to ensure more resilient electrical and 
logistics fuel systems support at Air Force installations: Energy must be 
included in Air Force Critical Infrastructure Program plans, studied during 
Vulnerability Assessments, exercised during base response activities, and, 
ultimately, incorporated into full-spectrum operational planning to fully 
observe and consider the potential deleterious effects. 
 
The Air Force is working to determine an associated level of vulnerability at their 
installations but needs complete integration of information from other Department of 
Energy, Department of Homeland Security, and DoD entities.  Whatever tool the end-
user decides to implement, vulnerability will only be adequately managed if there is a 
system in place that keeps reiterating the importance of what is being done.  Whether it is 
incentive based or otherwise, individuals need to be reminded that they can make a 
difference in managing a much larger vulnerability. 
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Chapter 3.  Methodology 
 
This chapter explains the unique methodology used to analyze historical power 
outage data and the potential impacts on Air Force installations.  Through the data 
collection and analysis, an awareness tool was created to help properly identify an 
installation’s vulnerability to future power outages.  Information collected from the 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) was imported and analyzed with a geographic 
information system (GIS) software, ArcGIS, to determine the geographic locations of 
historical power outages and their proximity to Air Force installations.  The main tool 
utilized within the ArcGIS was the inverse distance weighted (IDW) methodology, which 
interpolates the value between data points to create contour maps.  The information 
developed from the GIS analysis provided historical trends for power outages based on 
duration, number of customers affected, and total power loss.  The combination of these 
three maps using the raster calculator in ArcGIS, creates an overall vulnerability map for 
the different regions of the United States (U.S.) as shown in Figure 8. 
 
Data Source  
Utilizing GIS to analyze power outages is an innovative approach compared to 
traditional statistical analysis often used to determine historical trends (Hines et al., 2008; 
Mili et al., 2004).  In fact, this approach needs three important types of data (duration, 
number of people affected, and power loss) to successfully perform the spatial analysis.  
Collecting and scrubbing the information about power outages was the first step that 
needed to be completed before being able to analyze the data.  Although the EIA’s 
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database contained a large volume of information, some data were found to be either 
missing or incorrect.  In particular, since the formation of the database in January 2000, 
many utility companies have changed names since they originally reported information.  
Additionally, although the EIA forms require utility companies to report details regarding 
the location of power outages, this information typically only identifies the equipment 
affected and not the geographic location.  As a result, it was important to be able to 
interpolate the origins of the power outages and the areas affected.  The addition of 
spatial reference through latitude and longitude global positioning coordinates facilitates 
interpolation within the GIS software. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Data Collection and Analysis Process 
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Major Disturbances and Unusual Occurrences Data 
Published research efforts analyzing the electric grid often rely on the Disturbance 
Analysis Working Group (DAWG) database maintained by the North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC).  Although the DAWG database is fairly complete, its 
major shortcomings include a lack of outage duration and no requirement for all outages 
to be reported.  Therefore, the analysis presented in this research used data obtained from 
monthly Electric Disturbance Events summaries maintained by the EIA.  The time period 
for the data ranged from 1 January 2000 to 31 August 2009.  The specific data fields 
included in the analysis were the power loss (in Megawatts (MW)), number of people 
affected, and duration of the power disturbance.  Previous research had utilized these 
same fields to perform their analysis, in addition to considering the time of day (Mili et 
al., 2004; Hines et al., 2008; Savageau, 2004). (Savageau, 2004) 
Over the past 10 years, the EIA has changed the forms utility companies use to 
report outages.  Therefore, the summaries are based on information obtained from 
emergency incident and disturbance reports (EIA-417) prior to December 2008 and 
electric emergency incidence and disturbance reports (OE-417) from December 2008 to 
August 2009.  Both forms, shown as Appendix A and B, respectively, require the same 
information to be filed with the EIA’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy 
Reliability (Defense Science Board Task Force, 2008).  The EIA requires companies to 
file an EIA-417 when one or more of the following conditions are met. 
(1) Initiates 3 percent or more system voltage reduction 
(2) Disconnects circuits supplying over 100 megawatts of firm customer load 
(3) Issues a public appeal to the public for a voluntary reduction in electricity use 
(4) Has existing or anticipated fuel supply emergency situations  
(5) Suspects an act of sabotage or terrorism 
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The OE-417 form is actually an alert notification to the Department of Energy (DOE) 
regarding actual problems within the electric system; it can be also used to identify 
potential concerns.  However, the EIA does not record all power disturbances because the 
reporting thresholds specified for the OE-417 are typically not applicable to smaller 
utilities.  In other words, the data does not include all power outages – only reported 
power disturbances meeting the above criteria.  As a result, the data represents events 
with far larger customer impacts over a much wider service territory.   
After it was determined that electric companies were required to report a power 
outage, the timeliness of informing the EIA was determined by whether the event 
constituted a ‘normal alert’ or an ‘emergency alert.’  The requirements for both alert 
levels are described in Table 1.  For ‘emergency alerts,’ utility companies are required to 
complete the OE-417 within an hour of the event and must follow-up as circumstances 
change.  In addition, for events classified as ‘normal alerts,’ utility companies must 
complete the OE-417 within 6 hours of the incident and follow-up with any change in the 
outage.  Both alerts require the reporting company to submit a final form to the EIA 
within 48 hours detailing as much information as possible regarding the power outage. 
As was briefly discussed, both the EIA and DAWG databases lacked specific 
detailed information about the location of the people affected and the origin of the 
original power incident.  EIA’s OE-417 (Appendix A) requires utility companies to 
report the origin of the power outage within their service area, but this information is 
“protected” and not readily available for analysis as it details significant failure points 
within the nation’s power grid.  The specifics regarding what is actually required can be 
found in Schedule 2 of the OE-417 (Appendix B).    
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Table 1.  EIA Alert Reporting Guidance (Form OE-417) 
 
E
m
er
ge
nc
y 
A
le
rt
 
[ ] Actual physical attack that causes major interruptions or impacts to critical infrastructure 
facilities or to operations 
[ ] Actual cyber or communications attack that causes major interruptions of electrical 
system operations 
[ ] Complete operational failure or shut-down of the transmission and/or distribution 
electrical system 
[ ] Electrical System Separation (Islanding) where part or parts of a power grid remain(s) 
operational in an otherwise blacked out area or within the partial failure of an integrated 
electrical system 
[ ] Uncontrolled loss of 300 Megawatts or more of firm system loads for more than 15 
minutes from a single incident 
[ ] Load shedding of 100 Megawatts or more implemented under emergency operational 
policy 
[ ] System-wide voltage reductions of 3 percent or more 
[ ] Public appeal to reduce the use of electricity for purposes of maintaining the continuity of 
the electric power system 
N
or
m
al
 A
le
rt
 [ ] Suspected physical attacks that could impact electric power system adequacy or 
reliability; or vandalism which target components of any security systems 
[ ] Suspected cyber or communications attacks that could impact electric power system 
adequacy or vulnerability 
[ ] Loss of electric service to more than 50,000 customers for 1 hour or more 
[ ] Fuel supply emergencies that could impact electric power system adequacy or reliability 
 
 
Geospatially Referenced Layers 
The second data collection involved the integration of pre-made layer files into a 
consolidated map showing U.S. boundaries and the location of military installations.  
Within ArcGIS, layers are defined as a collection of components that are projected over 
other components and can be manipulated separately from other layers.  For the purposes 
of this analysis, the coordinate system that was used was an industry standard, the 
geographic coordinate system world geodetic system 1984 (GCS WGS 1984).  The data 
layers for Air Force installations and states were collected from the online National Atlas 
(U.S. Department of the Interior, 2009), which replaced the original paper-bound version 
of this service for maps of the U.S.  Two layer files were subsequently used, one layer 
showing all military installations and another showing state boundaries.  Since the focus 
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of this analysis strictly pertained to Air Force installations, all other military installations 
were removed from the layer.  The incorporation of these two layers with data collected 
from the EIA’s database aggregated all the information necessary to analyze and assess 
an Air Force installation’s vulnerability to power outages.   
 
Data Adjustment  
The main objective of the data collection effort was to assess historical power 
outage data and determine if individual Air Force installations appear to be susceptible 
(or vulnerable) to certain types of power outages, to include overall duration and number 
of customers affected.  As is the case with receiving third party information, it does not 
always contain all the necessary components to easily perform the desired analysis.  In 
this instance, much of the data received from the EIA, through the EO-417 and EIA-417 
forms, needed to be adjusted such that it could be analyzed within ArcGIS.  In addition, it 
was necessary to attach spatial references to each power outage, which was performed in 
conjunction with the validation of current electric companies and renaming ones that 
have since merged.  The final database is found in Appendix C.  
 
Power Outage Company Identification Adjustment 
Utility companies are required to report a great deal of information on the EIA-
417 and OE-417 forms, including the name of the power company responsible for the 
outage and the NERC region to which they belong.  However, many of the companies 
were found to no longer exist; they were either sold, merged with other companies, or 
simply went bankrupt.  As a result, it was important to create a consolidated list of 
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existing companies and their respective areas of responsibility.  For instance, if company 
X reported an outage in March 2005 and merged with corporation Y in 2008, corporation 
Y would assume responsibility for all reported outages by company X.  Once a 
consolidated list of existing power companies was created, it was necessary to determine 
the service areas for each power company and the centroid of their area of responsibility.  
An example of this is shown in Figure 9 for a gas and electric service provider in South 
Carolina.  Following one of the study’s original assumptions, the information for each 
power outage is applied at the center of each power company’s service area.  The 
resulting center (or centroid) is based on the geographic location of the electric service 
provider’s service area. 
 
 
Figure 9.  Example Centroid of Electric Service Area (SCE&G, 2010) 
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By searching each utility company’s website, it was possible to determine their 
service area and then use a global coordinate system to determine the centroid of the area 
of responsibility.  This information was then incorporated into the spreadsheet containing 
the EIA’s power outages.  The inclusion of this information allows for spatial analysis 
within GIS to be performed.  However, it was necessary to polish the data from the EIA 
to remove data points that were missing information and ensure that all the reported data 
was in a consistent format. 
 
EIA Database Adjustment 
At this point in the process, the spreadsheet contains the names of the updated 
power companies and their spatial coordinates; however, the remainder of the 
information needed to be standardized.  Of the initial 720 records in the database, 234 
were missing at least one of the identified attributes and 43 were outside the continental 
U.S.  Eliminating these records resulted in a total of 443 data records to be analyzed.  
Within the remaining data, it was important to ensure that the fields for power loss, 
number of people affected, and duration each used a standardized format.  Otherwise, an 
extraneous value that was either too large or small could bias the analysis.  Upon 
importing the information from the spreadsheets into ArcGIS, it was important to remove 
any special formatting in the database.  This was required since the spreadsheet software 
and GIS do not always interpret formulas and formatting the same.  The remaining 
modifications included simple formatting within the spreadsheet program.  Once the 
adjustments of the EIA’s database were complete, the data analysis could proceed.   
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Data Analysis 
Before conducting spatial analysis, the data was examined for any trends in either 
the number or magnitude of power outages from January 2000 to August 2009.  Caution 
must be used with these trend plots since the charts represent the number of reported 
outages and not the actual number of outages.  However, the incorporation of geospatial 
analysis through GIS can provide a much more detailed picture displaying the impacts of 
power outages on surrounding communities.  To analyze the data with ArcGIS, the IDW 
method was used with each of the three separate components (power loss, number of 
people affected, and duration).  Using the raster calculator in ArcGIS, the three layers 
were compiled into an overall vulnerability contour map showing different levels across 
the continental U.S.   
To investigate the vulnerability of Air Force installations to different types of 
power outages, the Spatial Analyst Tools in the ArcGIS software from the Environmental 
Systems Research Institute, Inc. (ESRI), were used to perform spatial interpolation of the 
data.  As part of the initial setup, it was necessary to ensure that the coordinate system of 
all layers and the imported EIA data records were consistent with the GCS WGS 1984 
format.  The next step was to create a personal geodatabase (GDB) file, which is an 
object-oriented graphic database that allows all information contained within the map file 
to be consolidated in one central location.  Typically, if information is added from 
random places, the map simply uses these references to refer to the information.  As a 
result, if the information was moved or deleted, the different map components would 
need to be re-referenced before being displayed correctly.  Where this comes in handy is 
if the map were to move from one computer to another computer; each referenced layer 
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would only have to be referenced back to one location as opposed to searching for all the 
scattered components.  The creation of the personal GDB file, in conjunction with setting 
up the layers with uniform coordinate systems, puts the information into a format where 
it can now be analyzed.   
The ability to analyze data with GIS software ultimately depends on the 
anticipated results and the type of outcome expected.  As defined by Childs (2004), 
procedures involving interpolation determine values on a surface between sampled 
points.  As displayed in Table 2, there are multiple interpolation tools available within 
ArcGIS.  However, the IDW tool provided the best option, when comparing the different 
options in Table 2, since it allows flexibility to weight closer data points more heavily 
than those far away.  The Spatial Analyst Tools, and specifically IDW, focus on the use 
of deterministic approaches to estimate “cell values by averaging the values of sample 
data points in the neighborhood of each processing cell” (ESRI, 2007).     
 
Table 2.  Interpolation Tools within ESRI ArcGIS (ESRI, 2006) 
 
TYPE DESCRIPTION 
IDW Interpolates a surface from points using an inverse distance weighted 
technique 
Spline Interpolates a surface from points using a minimum curvature spline 
technique 
Trend Interpolates a surface from points using a trend technique 
Kriging Interpolates a grid from a set of points using kriging 
Natural 
Neighbor 
Interpolates a surface from points using a natural neighbor technique 
Topo to Raster Interpolates a hydrologically correct surface from point, line, and 
polygon data. 
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Since power outages are scattered across the U.S., it is important to be able to 
interpolate between observed points to determine an Air Force installation’s vulnerability 
to power outages.  According to Tobler’s Law (Tobler, 1970), “everything is related to 
everything else, but near things are more related than distant things.”  This concept is the 
premise behind IDW analysis, which states that points closer to a central node (i.e., an 
Air Force installation) will affect the node more than points farther away, even though 
the points may be larger.  In other words, power outages closer to a base are more likely 
to affect the base than those far away.  The IDW method was performed by calculating 
values based on a variable radius determined by the closest 12 points.  Interpolating 
through IDW was performed on the individual power outage points in relation to Air 
Force installations as shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10.  IDW for a Sample set of Air Force Installations 
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The search radii, in conjunction with power, were two components that had the 
largest impact on the overall IDW results.  In Figure 10, the different radius diameters are 
dependent on the number of power outages in the surrounding area such that each circle 
includes 12 power outages.  For instance, the base in Ohio has the smallest circle since 12 
power outages were in closer proximity than the base found in Tennessee, which has a 
much larger circle.  It can be interpreted that the smaller a circle, the higher the apparent 
concentration of power outages surrounding the base.  A higher power value created a 
larger emphasis on the nearest points which in turn would create more detail on the final 
map. 
Elaborating further with Figure 11, IDW utilizes a technique called Shepard’s Method to 
interpolate values of data points based on existing data.  Equation 1 states that the 
magnitude at (x,y) is equal to the summation of all surrounding points at some particular 
weight (wi).  The weight is further defined in Equation 2 as the distance between the 
known data point and the value to be determined at (x,y) raised to a negative power.  
Throughout this model, the power (p) was determined to be 2, which is the default value 
in both Shepard’s Method and ArcGIS IDW interpolation.  Equation 3 defines the actual 
distance between the known data points and areas being interpolated.  Finally, Equation 4 
is the combination of Equations 1 through 3 which calculates the magnitude of the 
interpolated data points.  The combination of these three equations fully defines 
Shepard’s Method for interpolating unknown values.  In ArcGIS, these equations are 
hidden from the user and the only values that must be entered are n, the number of data 
points to be considered, and the power, p.  For both n and p, the default values (12 and 2, 
respectively) were chosen as a starting point for the analysis.  The rest of the analysis is 
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automatically performed and the results are produced as a raster file which can be further 
analyzed. 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Inverse Distance Weighted Model (ESRI, 2007) 
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F(x,y) = Unknown magnitude at unknown point (x,y) 
(xi, yi) = Point with known magnitude 
fi = known magnitude at point (xi, yi) 
wi = weighted value of point (xi, yi) on (x, y) 
hi = distance from point (xi, yi) to (x, y) 
p = power (or effect) that point (xi, yi) has on (x, y) (2 is the default) 
n = number of points (12 is the default) 
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GIS Data Analysis and Model Development 
 IDW can now be performed in ArcGIS using the guidelines described in the 
Procedural Log developed for this research and shown in Appendix D.  The first step is to 
perform an IDW for each of the three previously identified components:  duration, power 
loss (in MW), and number of people affected.  The output was a contour map for each 
component across the U.S.  Individually, these created layers do not tell the complete 
story; when combined into a single contour map though, they reveal the vulnerability of 
areas based on varying levels of outage durations, power loss, and number of people 
affected. 
 To properly compile the three layers, it was important to first normalize, or 
somehow standardize, the information across the three layers.  This is important because 
if the data from the three layers is simply added, the number of people affected will 
completely dominate the output results.  The reason behind this assumption is the units:  
the number of people affected is in the millions, while both the power loss and duration 
are  in the hundreds.  In addition, all three components are necessary to be compiled since 
the three components are not directly related to one another.  In some instances, a power 
outage that has a high power loss might affect a large group of people; however, this is 
not always true.  For instance, industry can dominate power consumption even though it 
typically represents only a small population.  This led to the development of the 
following equation to determine vulnerability. 
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   (5)
 
N = Total number of people affected 
NMAX = Maximum value for number of people affected 
M = Megawatt loss 
MMAX = Maximum value for megawatt loss 
D = Duration 
DMAX = Maximum value for duration 
 
 
Using Equation 5, the three layers are individually normalized such that the resulting 
values range from 0 to 1 (with 0 being no effect and 1 having the largest effect).  The 
numerators of the terms in the equation represent all values calculated within the 
respective layers through IDW interpolation, whereas the denominators are the maximum 
value for each respective layer.   
 The incorporation of the above equations in ArcGIS is accomplished using the 
raster calculator.  This tool allows different components to be aggregated into a single 
layer.  Once Equation 1 is used in the raster calculator, the output is a contour map 
showing the vulnerability of regions in the U.S. to power outages.  The output is a unit-
less map with associated vulnerabilities based on the weights described in Equation 2.  
Within the map are contour levels showing areas with a low and high vulnerability index 
such that areas with lower levels are less likely to be impacted by large-scale power 
outages; whereas, in areas with a high vulnerability index, they are more likely to be 
impacted by a large-scale power outage.  Each base falls within a region on the map and 
therefore a value, based on the calculated vulnerability layer, can be determined for each 
Air Force installation. 
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Summary 
The objective of this study was to develop a model for assessing the level of 
vulnerability for Air Force installations based on power outages from 2000 to 2009 in the 
EIA database.  Scrubbing the data and putting it in the same format, along with using the 
same coordinate system, was required prior to analyzing the point masses.  IDW and the 
raster calculator were used in ArcGIS to determine the associated levels of vulnerability 
for Air Force installations.  These results then provided what is called the level of 
vulnerability, ranging from low to high, which installations can use as a basis to 
investigate mitigation efforts.  
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Chapter 4.  Results and Analysis 
 
Existing literature has a void regarding research on power outages in the United 
States (U.S.) and the effects from their spatial relationship to surrounding communities.  
The focus of this thesis was to examine the effects of power outages on Air Force 
installations by analyzing the Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) power outage 
database using both spreadsheet software and ArcGIS.  Previous research has focused 
strictly on the statistical analysis of existing power outage databases to investigate trends 
and correlations.  Analysis for this thesis began by utilizing spreadsheet software to 
determine trends in the EIA’s database, to include different North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC) regions which might be a predictor of the anticipated 
results discovered from ArcGIS.  The main approach used in this study was the inverse 
distance weighted (IDW) method to examine the EIA’s power outage data points for 
megawatt (MW) loss, number of people affected, and duration for the individual points 
from January 2000 to August 2009.  Although the nation’s grid is connected to Canada, 
and NERC regions extend to Canada, the focus of this analysis is strictly limited to the 
continental U.S. and the effects felt therein. 
 
Initial Results 
A large number of data points from the EIA’s power outage database were 
missing one or more of the following components:  MW loss, number of affected 
customers, and total duration.  Of the original 720 data points from the EIA’s database, 
only 443 total points contained complete records and were subsequently used in the 
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analysis.  Additionally, some data points had incorrect information, to include utility 
company names that no longer existed.  A significant search for older companies led to 
the finding that many companies had merged into larger, present-day corporations.  
Although this might create some discrepancies within the final analysis, it is important to 
group the companies together such that the analysis could be performed within both the 
spreadsheet software and ArcGIS.   
Initial analysis of the EIA’s power outage database involved the utilization of 
spreadsheet software to graph different outage characteristics (duration, number affected, 
power loss) from January 2000 to September 2009.  Figures 12 through 14 represent 
categorized charts of the different outage characteristics.  No trends are apparent in any 
of the charts, yet it is apparent that between 2002 and 2003, there is a sizable jump in 
reported data.  The next analysis strove to investigate the number of reported outages per 
year since January 2000.  As shown in Figure 15, it is readily apparent that there are two 
distinct time periods within the specified timeframe, one from 2000 to 2002 and the other 
from 2003 to 2009.  Within each time period, the number of outages is relatively 
consistent (except for the anomaly in 2008).  It is unclear what caused the increase in 
outages between the two time periods; similarly, there is insufficient information to 
explain why reported power outages remained higher in the 2003 to 2009 time period.    
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Figure 12.  Categorized Power Outages by Duration 
 
 
 Figure 13.  Categorized Power Outages by Number Affected 
 
 
 Figure 14.  Categorized Power Outages by Power Loss 
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Figure 15.  Total Power Outages by Year 
 
The number of reported outages can be further broken down into the different 
NERC regions, power companies, and causes of disturbances.  It is important to 
investigate the origin of the outages to be able to determine if there are any patterns 
involving regional power reliability or even a significant impact due to natural disasters.  
First, it is important to understand that although the different NERC regional entities can 
be compared on paper, the fact of the matter is that their size and population they serve 
vary greatly.  However, further investigation of any possible regional trends might 
provide good insight regarding possible problems within a specific area.  As shown in 
Figure 16, the NERC regions experienced an unequal amount of power outages.  It is 
interesting to note that while some NERC regions (e.g., SPP, MRO, FRCC) experienced 
a fairly consistent number of outages, other regions (e.g., WECC, RFC, NPCC) had a 
sizeable increase in reported outages from January 2000 to August 2009.   
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Figure 16.  Power Outages by NERC Regions (EIA, 2009) 
 
Without additional research, it is difficult to fully address why some regions 
experienced a sudden jump in power outages.  Referencing Figure 16, it is possible to 
make the determination that over the past 10 years, some NERC regions had little to no 
gain in the number of power outages while other areas displayed a constant, annual 
increase in the number of outages.  For instance, California and the Western U.S. 
(WECC) have experienced many disturbances in recent years that have had a widespread 
impact and have occurred more frequently than in past years.     
 In addition to examining trends in the number of power outages, it is also possible 
to investigate if there are any trends in the reported causes of the power outages.  As 
shown in Figure 17, there were 13 different categories of causes for reported power 
outages.  No immediate observations can be made regarding the different types of power 
outages except the fact that nature tends to be the source of most power outages.  
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Information supporting the justification for why the outages caused by natural events are 
the highest cannot be specifically determined since it could be for a multitude of reasons.  
However, the nation’s electric grid might be increasingly susceptible to repeated abuse by 
nature and the lack of adequate preventive maintenance is causing additional numbers of 
power outages.  Another interpretation of Figure 17 could be that no matter how much 
preventative maintenance is performed, natural events are still going to occur at random 
and have a significant impact on the ability to supply power.  From the literature review 
in Chapter 2 though, this is unlikely since power companies have spent little money on 
the existing grid while operating it as close to maximum capacity as possible.  This in 
turn makes it easier for an otherwise small event to have a much larger impact.  Although 
insights can be gained from trend analysis, more detailed analysis is necessary. 
 
Intermediate Results 
The initial part of this research involved simply charting the EIA’s electrical 
disturbance database to determine any types of trends that might exist.  This section takes 
the next step by performing interpolation of the three separate data categories (duration, 
number of people affected and MW loss).  As was discussed in the literature review, the 
nation’s electric grid has evolved such that it is heavily interconnected and there exists a 
large potential for more widespread power outages.  This is the premise behind the use of 
IDW for the electric grid since what might happen in one area could permeate to other 
areas through the web of wires connecting the electric grid.   
 
 
63 
 
 
F
ig
ur
e 
17
.  
P
ow
er
 O
ut
ag
e 
D
is
tu
rb
an
ce
s 
by
 T
yp
e 
(E
IA
, 2
00
9)
 
 
 
64 
 
The results described herein take the next step in analysis by performing 
interpolation on the available data points to create a contour map reflecting vulnerability.  
Through the analysis of the three data categories, it was possible to create an overall 
vulnerability map compiling these different components.  Categories were created for the 
specific components, ranging from green to red scales as shown in Table 3, to allow the 
interpolated layers to be interpreted based on related data. 
 
Table 3.  Categorized Outage Components 
 
 MW Loss Number Affected Duration (Hours) Vulnerability Index 
Green (A) < 300 < 100,000 < 24 < 0.25 
Teal (B) 300 – 600 100,000 – 200,000 24 – 72 0.25 – 0.5 
Yellow (C) 600 – 1,000 200,000 – 300,000 72 – 120 0.5 – 0.75 
Orange (D) 1,000 – 2,000 300,000 – 600,000 120 – 192 0.75 – 1 
Red (E) > 2,000 > 600,000 > 192 > 1 
  
 
The categories for the megawatt loss were grouped based on actual power plant 
sizes found within the U.S.  For instance, of the 5,336 generators supplying power within 
the U.S., 81% produced power less than 300 MW, 7% produced power ranging from 300 
to 600 MW, 5% produced power ranging from 600 to 1,000 MW, 5% produced power 
ranging from 1,000 to 2,000 MW, and 2% produced power greater than 2,000 MW.  
Similarly, population categories were determined from the 2000 U.S. census.  For this 
category, 81% of U.S. counties have a population less than 100,000; 9% have a 
population between 100,000 and 200,000; 3% have a population between 200,000 and 
300,000; 4% have a population between 300,000 and 600,000; and 3% have a population 
in excess of 600,000.  For the power outage duration, the EIA database was used to group 
outage durations in similar categories.  Accordingly, 55% of the outages had a duration 
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less than 24 hours, 22% had a duration between 24 and 72 hours, 9% had a duration 
between 72 and 120 hours, 7% had a duration between 120 and 192 hours, and 7% had a 
duration greater than 192 hours.  These categories allow for bases to be categorized 
according to the ranges specified in Table 3. 
The last column in Table 3 shows the vulnerability index classifications as it was 
calculated for this particular study.  Based on Equation 5, it is important to keep in mind 
that the highest vulnerability index that could be calculated would theoretically be 3.  
This would be considered the worst case scenario where the maximum number of people 
are effected with the largest power loss and for the longest duration.  However, the ranges 
in this study were found to range from 0 to 1.83.  This implies that the largest value in 
one category did not always translate into the largest value in another category.  In order 
to determine the specific categorical breaks, a natural break option within ArcGIS was 
utilized to create the best group of similar values which maximizes the difference 
between the groups.  As shown by the different break points in Table 3, the vulnerability 
index levels are categorized for bases using the following descriptions. 
 Green (A) Level – Installations have a chance to experience a widespread 
power outage lasting a short duration 
 Teal (B) Level – Installations have a chance to experience a small scale power 
outage lasting less than two days. 
 Yellow (C) Level – Installations have a chance to experience a mid-size 
power outage lasting upwards of four days. 
 Orange (D) Level – Installations have a chance to experience a large power 
outage lasting upwards of a week. 
 Red (E) Level – Installations have an chance to experience a catastrophic 
power outage lasting more than one week. 
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Inverse Distance Weighted for Number of People Affected 
The number of people that a power disturbance actually affects depends on the 
utility company’s best guess as to the total number of homes affected.  Upon initial 
reporting, companies are required to submit an estimate for the total number of people 
affected; however, if the outage is widespread, or conversely, isolated, the exact number 
of individuals affected can vary significantly.  As a result, the total number of people 
affected by the power outage tends to align with both the duration and magnitude (in 
MW) of the power disturbance.  However, the higher the number of people affected, 
typically the wider the area impacted by the actual outage.  This was evident in the 
northeast blackout of 2003, when approximately 50 million people were affected across 
multiple states for an extended amount of time. 
The first analysis performed IDW on the number of people affected by power 
outages as shown in Figure 18.  Additional figures are provided in Appendix E showing a 
more detailed view of the IDW analysis for the number of people affected.  The proper 
way to interpret Figure 18 is that based on historical power outages, areas in red would 
have experienced outages that affected more than 600,000 people.  As it pertains to the 
Air Force, there are some installations that find themselves within the “hot zone,” where 
more people have technically been affected.  As shown in Table 4, Little Rock AFB, Los 
Angeles AFB, Tinker AFB, and Vance AFB have all experienced outages affecting more 
than 600,000 people.  This is a weighted collection over the past decade such that there 
might have been a large amount of small outages around the bases or simply a few large 
outages that had a very large impact.  Either way, bases that are shown as being in either 
the orange or red categories have experienced outages totaling the highest in the nation. 
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Figure 18.  Calculated IDW for Number Affected 
 
 
Table 4.  Calculated IDW of Number of People Affected for Air Force Installations 
FULLNAME FULLNAME FULLNAME
Altus AFB C 264,371 Hanscom AFB C 220,442 Moody AFB B 153,806
Andrews AFB B 124,079 Hill AFB A 82,519 Mountain Home AFB A 37,141
Arnold AFB C 217,659 Holloman AFB B 199,341 Nellis AFB B 136,155
Barksdale AFB D 350,195 Hurlburt Fld B 116,088 Offutt AFB B 122,956
Beale AFB B 115,465 Keesler AFB C 200,000 Patrick AFB B 196,924
Bolling AFB B 148,516 Kirtland AFB D 402,893 Peterson AFB B 124,628
Buckley AFB B 125,064 Lackland AFB B 163,511 Pope AFB B 105,149
Cannon AFB A 23,774 Langley AFB B 108,650 Randolph AFB B 138,498
Charleston AFB B 142,870 Laughlin AFB B 190,901 Robins AFB B 133,704
Columbus AFB C 255,011 Little Rock AFB E 1,418,436 Scott AFB A 71,228
Creech AFB B 139,430 Los Angeles AFB E 850,400 Seymour Johnson AFB B 101,857
Davis- Monthan AFB A 40,950 Luke AFB B 106,151 Shaw AFB B 137,264
Dover AFB B 113,662 Macdill AFB C 255,096 Sheppard AFB D 386,399
Dyess AFB B 168,562 Malmstrom AFB A 61,763 Tinker AFB E 1,660,047
Edwards AFB D 400,411 Maxwell AFB A 85,197 Travis AFB A 72,402
Eglin AFB B 113,105 Maxwell (Gunter) AFB A 84,448 Tyndall AFB B 124,403
Ellsworth AFB B 126,094 McChord AFB A 81,442 Vance AFB E 1,201,370
F E Warren AFB A 96,672 McConnell AFB D 481,009 Vandenberg AFB C 240,031
Fairchild AFB A 80,391 McGuire AFB A 76,587 Whiteman AFB C 251,038
Goodfellow AFB B 142,972 Minot AFB A 47,157 Wright-Patterson AFB B 122,554
Grand Forks AFB A 28,169
Number 
Affected
Number 
Affected
Number 
Affected
*NOTE:  Letter designations correspond to color codes in Figure 18. 
(A) 
(B) 
(C) 
(D) 
(E) 
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Inverse Distance Weighted for Total Hours Lost 
The total duration of the reported power outages has a large impact on the 
consumer’s ability to successfully operate.  In terms of power outage duration, there are 
two main factors to consider:  1) repeated power outages of short duration and 2) long-
term, sustained power outages.  As was previously discussed with the EIA database, 
power outages are not required to be reported unless 50,000 or more people are affected 
for greater than one hour.  As such, momentary outages, or outages lasting only minutes, 
often go unreported by utility companies unless they must be reported based on meeting 
other criteria.  As a result, the categorical values in Table 5 were based on the premise 
that long-term outages are much worse than shorter outages.  In some instances, if a 
power outage is very widespread, there are instances where some consumers have power 
restored almost immediately, whereas others are left without power for days or even 
weeks. 
As shown in Figure 19, a great deal of the U.S. has experienced power outages 
totaling more than 72 hours over the past decade.  A more detailed view of Figure 19 is 
displayed in Appendix F.  When utility companies file OE-417 (or EIA-417 prior to 
2008), they are required to report the final time that power was restored to all users.  
Whether or not the utility companies actually reported the data correctly, outages for over 
a week, or even five to seven days, represent a significant amount of time to be without 
power.  As shown in Table 5, only Macdill AFB was classified in the category for 
outages in excess of 192 hours; however, there were an additional 18 bases scattered 
through the U.S. that have experienced power failure lasting between 72 to 192 hours.   
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Figure 19.  Calculated IDW for Total Duration 
 
 
Table 5.  Calculated IDW of Total Duration for Air Force Installations 
FULLNAME FULLNAME FULLNAME
Altus AFB B 34 Hanscom AFB A 4 Moody AFB C 74
Andrews AFB C 95 Hill AFB C 103 Mountain Home AFB A 8
Arnold AFB C 100 Holloman AFB A 3 Nellis AFB C 108
Barksdale AFB D 173 Hurlburt Fld C 78 Offutt AFB A 7
Beale AFB A 8 Keesler AFB A 2 Patrick AFB B 61
Bolling AFB C 118 Kirtland AFB A 5 Peterson AFB B 45
Buckley AFB B 47 Lackland AFB B 31 Pope AFB B 54
Cannon AFB A 5 Langley AFB B 48 Randolph AFB B 26
Charleston AFB B 59 Laughlin AFB B 24 Robins AFB B 26
Columbus AFB C 88 Little Rock AFB C 77 Scott AFB C 79
Creech AFB C 107 Los Angeles AFB A 2 Seymour Johnson AFB B 40
Davis- Monthan AFB A 1 Luke AFB A 6 Shaw AFB B 62
Dover AFB B 67 Macdill AFB E 197 Sheppard AFB B 51
Dyess AFB A 14 Malmstrom AFB B 70 Tinker AFB D 180
Edwards AFB A 9 Maxwell AFB B 37 Travis AFB A 3
Eglin AFB C 73 Maxwell (Gunter) AFB B 35 Tyndall AFB B 72
Ellsworth AFB B 72 McChord AFB B 46 Vance AFB D 152
F E Warren AFB B 48 McConnell AFB D 156 Vandenberg AFB A 12
Fairchild AFB B 49 McGuire AFB A 6 Whiteman AFB C 105
Goodfellow AFB A 10 Minot AFB B 42 Wright-Patterson AFB C 74
Grand Forks AFB A 24
Duration Duration Duration
*NOTE:  Letter designations correspond to color codes in Figure 19. 
(A) 
(B) 
(C) 
(D) 
(E) 
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Inverse Distance Weighted for Total Megawatts Lost 
The total megawatt loss pertains to the amount of power not being supplied to 
meet the customer’s demand.  In other words, the megawatt loss can be directly tied to 
either productivity service or inconvenience.  The overall effect depends on the 
requirements set out by the consumer.  In fact, when individuals experience power loss, it 
is not always a complete blackout; it can also be a brownout where insufficient power is 
supplied.  Sometimes this can be even more devastating for industry since lower voltages 
can possibly damage equipment requiring a minimum standard to operate.  
Unfortunately, similar to the other two components, there are stipulations that require a 
utility company to report only on total megawatt loss resulting from an uncontrollable 
loss of at least 300 megawatts for more than 15 minutes.  As a result, outages not meeting 
this threshold go unreported, even though they could have potentially had a large impact. 
As mentioned previously, the amount of power loss was categorized according to 
the EIA’s database on available power generators across the U.S.   Large outages mean 
that more generators were affected by the drop in power; additionally, an increased strain 
was placed on remaining generators as they tried to compensate for the power shortage.  
After performing IDW for the power loss during the reported outages, the contour map 
shown in Figure 20 was created.  A more detailed view of Figure 20 can be found in 
Appendix G.  Only one base, Los Angeles AFB, fell within the high categorical range 
whereas an additional 14 bases had experienced power loss greater than 600 MW.  Table 
6 shows the interpolated values as determined by the available power outage data and 
IDW within ArcGIS.  The remainder of the installations fell within the lower ranges 
where power loss could be considered marginal. 
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Figure 20.  Calculated IDW for Power Loss 
 
Table 6.  Calculated IDW of Power Loss for Air Force Installations 
FULLNAME FULLNAME FULLNAME
Altus AFB B 305 Hanscom AFB B 456 Moody AFB C 683
Andrews AFB D 1,093 Hill AFB B 300 Mountain Home AFB A 186
Arnold AFB B 571 Holloman AFB B 436 Nellis AFB B 422
Barksdale AFB A 276 Hurlburt Fld B 482 Offutt AFB C 629
Beale AFB B 323 Keesler AFB B 300 Patrick AFB C 940
Bolling AFB D 1,444 Kirtland AFB C 869 Peterson AFB A 239
Buckley AFB A 242 Lackland AFB A 223 Pope AFB B 462
Cannon AFB B 551 Langley AFB B 488 Randolph AFB A 189
Charleston AFB B 573 Laughlin AFB B 306 Robins AFB D 1,896
Columbus AFB A 296 Little Rock AFB A 78 Scott AFB A 277
Creech AFB B 437 Los Angeles AFB E 2,430 Seymour Johnson AFB B 405
Davis- Monthan AFB A 138 Luke AFB B 403 Shaw AFB B 567
Dover AFB B 391 Macdill AFB D 1,040 Sheppard AFB B 324
Dyess AFB B 306 Malmstrom AFB B 437 Tinker AFB B 473
Edwards AFB D 1,111 Maxwell AFB B 455 Travis AFB A 161
Eglin AFB B 475 Maxwell (Gunter) AFB B 449 Tyndall AFB B 491
Ellsworth AFB C 737 McChord AFB B 310 Vance AFB B 456
F E Warren AFB B 303 McConnell AFB B 449 Vandenberg AFB C 772
Fairchild AFB B 435 McGuire AFB A 215 Whiteman AFB B 360
Goodfellow AFB B 325 Minot AFB C 982 Wright-Patterson AFB C 970
Grand Forks AFB C 991
MW Loss MW Loss MW Loss
*NOTE:  Letter designations correspond to color codes in Figure 20. 
(A) 
(B) 
(C) 
(D) 
(E) 
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Final Results 
The final step in performing the analysis for this thesis was compiling the 
different layers into a consolidated vulnerability map, showing the weighted vulnerability 
index.  Defined in Chapter 3, Equation 4 utilized the maximum value found within each 
component layer in an effort to transform the compiled elements into unit-less values 
ranging between 0 and 1.  As a result, the theoretical maximum value which could be 
assessed within the consolidated analysis is 3; since the data categories for the 
vulnerability index were shifted to the left though, the calculated vulnerabilities never 
reached above 1.8 units.  As a result, the vulnerability index categories were shifted to the 
left, thereby providing a more realistic view of the interpolated data.  The use of raster 
calculation created the map in Figure 21 and Table 7, which displays the vulnerability 
levels at Air Force installations.  More detailed maps of Figure 21 are displayed in 
Appendix H.  It is important to understand these results do not mean that an area is more 
susceptible to the extremes for each category:  in other words, high vulnerability indices 
do not mean that the area will experience power outages that affect a large number of 
people, last for an extended duration, and have a high power loss.    
There are only a few bases in categories at or above the average level (level C), 
with most bases being in the lower range for more significant power outages.  Tinker 
AFB, located near Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, was the only base with a vulnerability 
score greater than 1.  This implies that the base, compared to the remainder of the U.S. 
based on historical data, experiences power outages that have the largest impact.  Seven 
other bases are within the yellow and orange (0.5 to 1) groupings.  Each of these bases 
might consider evaluating their power generation capability to determine its adequacy.   
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Figure 21.  Calculated Weighted Vulnerability (Individual Outages) 
 
 
Table 7.  Calculated Vulnerability of Power Outages for Air Force Installations 
FULLNAME FULLNAME FULLNAME
Altus AFB A 0.22 Hanscom AFB A 0.15 Moody AFB B 0.32
Andrews AFB B 0.40 Hill AFB B 0.32 Mountain Home AFB A 0.06
Arnold AFB B 0.39 Holloman AFB A 0.14 Nellis AFB B 0.36
Barksdale AFB C 0.59 Hurlburt Fld B 0.29 Offutt AFB A 0.14
Beale AFB A 0.10 Keesler AFB B 0.35 Patrick AFB B 0.33
Bolling AFB C 0.51 Kirtland AFB B 0.27 Peterson AFB A 0.19
Buckley AFB A 0.19 Lackland AFB A 0.17 Pope AFB A 0.22
Cannon AFB A 0.08 Langley AFB A 0.21 Randolph AFB A 0.14
Charleston AFB B 0.26 Laughlin AFB A 0.17 Robins AFB B 0.33
Columbus AFB B 0.35 Little Rock AFB D 0.76 Scott AFB A 0.25
Creech AFB B 0.36 Los Angeles AFB C 0.62 Seymour Johnson AFB A 0.18
Davis- Monthan AFB A 0.03 Luke AFB A 0.10 Shaw AFB B 0.27
Dover AFB B 0.25 Macdill AFB C 0.69 Sheppard AFB B 0.31
Dyess AFB A 0.14 Malmstrom AFB A 0.24 Tinker AFB E 1.15
Edwards AFB B 0.30 Maxwell AFB A 0.18 Travis AFB A 0.05
Eglin AFB B 0.28 Maxwell (Gunter) AFB A 0.17 Tyndall AFB B 0.28
Ellsworth AFB B 0.31 McChord AFB A 0.18 Vance AFB D 0.90
F E Warren AFB A 0.19 McConnell AFB C 0.62 Vandenberg AFB A 0.21
Fairchild AFB A 0.20 McGuire AFB A 0.07 Whiteman AFB B 0.40
Goodfellow AFB A 0.12 Minot AFB A 0.23 Wright-Patterson AFB B 0.34
Grand Forks AFB A 0.18
Vulnerability 
Index
Vulnerability 
Index
Vulnerability 
Index
 
*NOTE:  Letter designations correspond to color codes in Figure 21. 
(A) 
(B) 
(C) 
(D) 
(E) 
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Summary 
The consolidated vulnerability map created with ArcGIS is a good tool for Air 
Force installations to use to interpret their vulnerability to power outages based on 
historical data.  Although interpolation is only a best guess for determining values 
between existing data points, it provides a good baseline for bases to determine their 
potential for future power outages.  However, that is only part of the problem.  Mitigation 
plans must be developed to anticipate and prepare for future outages. 
Power outages throughout the U.S. are going to continue into the future and, 
according to Figure 16, are beginning to rise in certain geographic regions.  As such, it is 
important for Air Force installations to adequately address their own capabilities and act 
upon these findings to secure their power for the future.  Power failure is no excuse for 
critical missions to be affected since national security could also be affected. 
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Chapter 5.  Conclusion 
 
 This research effort sought to analyze historical power outages reported to the 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) to determine areas of variable vulnerability to 
future power outages.  These findings are the result of applying a new method to 
investigate historical power outage data by analyzing them using spatial relationships.  
One of the major assumptions supporting this approach has been the idea that the electric 
grid is highly interconnected and events in one area could have a direct impact on 
surrounding areas.  The analysis of power outage data using ArcGIS allowed for the 
creation of contour maps representing varying vulnerability levels.  The previous chapter 
discussed the findings and provided insight as to the vulnerability levels at Air Force 
installations relating to varying levels of power outage duration, power loss, and number 
of people affected.  This chapter summarizes the findings from this research effort and 
provides suggestions for future research. 
 
Thesis Purpose 
As previously identified in Chapter 1, the purpose of this thesis contained two 
important components:  the analysis of data to determine vulnerabilities and the 
identification of mitigation efforts to reduce those vulnerabilities at Air Force 
installations.  This research aimed to investigate historical power outages by utilizing the 
EIA’s unusual occurrence and disturbance database and focusing on information 
regarding power outage loss, duration, and number of people affected.  Utilizing a 
handful of tools within ArcGIS, in conjunction with the location of the power companies 
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responsible for the individual outages, it was possible to perform spatial analysis of the 
areas affected by the outages.  The results from this analysis provide critical information 
necessary to determine overall levels of vulnerability for areas between the power 
outages.   
The second portion of this research concerns recommendations to mitigate 
associated vulnerabilities.  In contrast, one of the worst decisions to be made would be to 
simply do nothing and hope the problem corrects itself.  However, as it relates to the Air 
Force, the consequence for inaction could result in an immediate threat to national 
security.  Therefore, three suggested actions must be considered:  changing user 
behaviors, investigating internal capacity, and negotiating special actions with the electric 
company.  Changing individual behaviors would result in immediate benefits as load 
levels would decrease and on reserve margin would increase, thereby resulting in a 
decreased chance for power outages in the near future.   
Besides addressing individual behavior, the Air Force could initiate an 
investigation to determine the availability of both personnel and equipment to manage 
critical facilities during instances of prolonged power outages.  The result could be that 
some bases may have sufficient capacity for their critical facilities, as opposed to other 
bases which might simply be lacking in adequate generation capability.  As a result, Air 
Force senior leadership could allocate additional resources to bases in higher 
vulnerability categories if it is deemed a priority.  This would help ensure that all Air 
Force installations are prepared for future power outages.   
The last suggestion for mitigation involves negotiating with electric companies 
through one of two methods.  The first approach involves changing existing contracts 
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such that bases receive priority after power outages such that restoration efforts would be 
focused on restoring power to military installations first.  Since individual bases are not 
experts regarding contract negotiations, the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency 
(AFCESA) Utility Rates Management Team (URMT) might need to lead negotiation 
efforts.  However, this would come at a tremendous cost to bases as utility companies 
would more than likely increase electricity rates.  If this is not possible, a second 
alternative would be to construct privately operated generation facilities on Air Force 
installations.  Some bases have already begun working with local power companies to 
allow generation facilities on military installations that would provide immediate power 
to bases during power outages.  This last alternative secures the demands for future Air 
Force installations, yet it is a long-term approach and not the best option for all bases.  
Regardless, bases need to investigate not only their internal power generation capability, 
but also ensure plans exist for securing future power. 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 This research is a pioneering study using historical power outage information and 
transforming it into an awareness tool for future power disturbances.  However, as with 
any new effort, there are areas outside the scope of the research which serve as 
recommendations for future researchers.  This thesis effort subsequently identified 
multiple areas that should be pursued to further investigate U.S. power outages and their 
implications on Air Force installations.  The first recommendation is to refine the 
components used in the raster calculator; in particular, the weights associated with the 
categories of power loss, people affected, and duration should be further investigated, 
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especially their impact as it relates to vulnerability calculations.  A second 
recommendation would be to pursue the concept of risk and how vulnerability levels 
translate into individual risk levels.  A third recommendation would be to refine the 
collected data and the way in which power outage origins were defined; specifically, is 
there a better way to identify outage origins besides service area centroids?  A fourth 
recommendation involves narrowing the project scope and investigating regional impacts 
of power outages in limited areas of the country.  This would involve focusing additional 
data collection and analyses to a smaller geographic region of the U.S. than the lower 48 
states.  Lastly, the integration of causes and the created maps would allow a 
determination to be made regarding correlations between the causes and the outcomes 
experienced from outages.   
 
Conclusion 
 It has not been until recently that the condition of the nation’s electric grid has 
been understood and actions been initiated to fix identified problems.  Although, efforts 
are currently underway to modernize the electric grid to reduce power disturbances, they 
will take significant time to successfully implement.  This is further compounded by the 
fact that even though more restrictive guidance would be in place, it is no guarantee that 
everyone will follow the standards or that the standards will be adequately enforced.  
Herein lies the focus behind this research in being able to determine varying 
vulnerabilities levels based on historical data.  With this thesis, it is possible to address 
the following question:  what vulnerabilities exist at installations for future power 
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outages?  This is crucial since the power to assess each Air Force installation’s 
vulnerability can only help in being a planning tool for focusing mitigation efforts.   
 Whether Air Force installations use power to simply operate maintenance shops 
or power the flight line, the demand for power is a necessity.  Especially as it relates to 
military installations, the lack of power can sometimes prove detrimental to not only 
daily activities but also national security.  Therefore, further efforts by the consumer to 
control vulnerabilities to power outages must be taken in order to ensure power is 
available to critical facilities.   
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APPENDIX A.  Form EIA-417 (Emergency Incident and Disturbance Report) 
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APPENDIX B.  Form OE-417 (Electric Emergency Incident Report) 
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APPENDIX C.  EIA Power Outages (January 2000 – September 2009) 
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APPENDIX D.  ArcGIS Procedural Log 
METADATA:  
 
 Description: 
  Status of the data:  Complete (Update Frequency:  None Planned) 
  Time Period for which the data is relevant:  3/25/2010 at time 1900 
  Data storage and access information:  
   File Name:  FINAL_Vulnerability Map (2009_03Mar_10).mxd 
   Data Processing Environment:  Microsoft Windows Vista Version 6.0, ESRI  
    ArcCatalog 9.3.1.3000 
  Standards used to create this document: 
   Standard Name:  FGDC Content Standards for Digital Geospatial Metadata 
   Standard Version:  FGDC-STD-001-1998 
   Time Convention used in this document:  Local Time 
 
 Spatial: 
  Horizontal Coordinate System: 
   Geographic Coordinate System Name:  World Geodetic System 1984 
   Horizontal Datum Name:  North American Datum of 1983 
  Bounding Coordinates:   
   West:  -125.378747664 digital degrees 
   East:  -66.184089108 digital degrees 
   North:  59.957198096 digital degrees 
   South:  19.149255297 digital degrees 
  Sources:  Electric Disturbance Events – Monthly and Annual Summaries (EIA) 
 
 Attributes: 
  Overview Description: 
   A unique characteristic of electric power is that it cannot be stored for future use.  
   Electric energy suppliers, therefore, must build and maintain generating and  
   transmission facilities capable of meeting the demand levels for electric power at 
   all times.  Tracking disturbances that impact the integrated generating and  
   transmission facilities is an important Federal task along with examining issues 
   associated with insufficient capacity reserves. 
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Software requirement:  
 Microsoft Excel, ArcGIS 9.3 (Extensions: Data Management & Spatial Analyst Tools) 
 
1) Download Census Data to working folder 
a) Access http://nationalatlas.gov/atlasftp.html  
b) Download County Boundaries  
i) Boundaries  County Boundaries, 2001  Download countyp020.tar.gz  Save 
File 
ii) Extract data using a Zipping software within the main directory 
c) Download Water Bodies 
i) Water  Streams and Waterbodies  Download hydrogm020.tar.gz  Save File 
ii) Extract data using a Zipping software within the main directory 
d) Download State Boundaries 
i) Boundaries  State Boundaries  Download statesp020.tar.gz  Save File 
ii) Extract data using a Zipping software within the main directory 
e) Access http://www2.census.gov/geo/tiger/TIGER2009/  
f) Download Federal Lands 
i) Download tl_2009_us_mil  Save File 
ii) Extract data using a Zipping software within the main directory 
 
2) Define downloaded layer coordinate systems 
a) Open ArcCatalog 
b) Locate the downloaded layers  select the files 
i) In the right window, right click ‘statesp020’  Properties 
(1) Select  Geographic Coordinate Systems  North America  ‘North 
American Datum 1983.prj’ 
(2) Click ‘Add’ 
ii) In the right window, right click ‘countyp020’  Properties 
(1) Select  Geographic Coordinate Systems  North America  ‘North 
American Datum 1983.prj’ 
(2) Click ‘Add’ 
iii) In the right window, right click ‘hydrogm020’  Properties 
(1) Select  Geographic Coordinate Systems  North America  ‘North 
American Datum 1983.prj’ 
(2) Click ‘Add’ 
iv) In the right window, right click ‘tl_2009_us_mil’  Properties 
(1) Select  Geographic Coordinate Systems  North America  ‘North 
American Datum 1983.prj’ 
(2) Click ‘Add’ 
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3) Create personal geodatabase (GDB) file in ArcGIS 
a) ArcToolbox  Data Management Tools  Workspace  Create Personal GDB 
b) Create the file within the same direction (but a sub-folder) to the ArcGIS Map file 
c) Name the file to something relevant such at ‘PowerOutageAnalysis’ 
 
4) Add Downloaded data layers and add to GDB 
a) County Data 
i) Add data  County Data (shape file) 
ii) Filter Data such that only counties for the continental United States are shown 
(1) Right Click Layer  Properties  Definition Query  Query Builder 
(2) Paste into field  NOT( "STATE" = 'AK' ) AND NOT( "STATE" = 'HI' ) 
AND NOT( "STATE" = 'PR' ) AND NOT( "STATE" = 'VI' ) 
iii) Project Data from GCS_North_American_1983 to GSC_WGS_1984 
(1) ArcToolbox  Data Management Tools  Projections and Transformations 
 Feature  Project 
(a) Input Dataset of Feature Class = County layer added 
(b) Output Dataset or Feature Class = County_Layer (save within GDB 
created earlier) 
(c) Output Coordinate System = GCS_WGS_1984 
(d) Geographic Transformation  NAD_1983_To_WGS_1984_1 
(e) Click OK 
(2) Rename new layer to something that describes it (i.e. County Boundaries, 
2001) 
(3) Remove original countyp020 file from layers 
b) State Data 
i) Add data  State Data (shape file) 
ii) Filter Data such that only counties for the continental United States are shown 
(1) Right Click Layer  Properties  Definition Query  Query Builder 
(2) Paste into field  NOT ( "STATE" = 'Alaska' ) AND NOT ( "STATE" = 
'Hawaii' ) AND NOT ( "STATE" = 'Puerto Rico' ) AND NOT ( "STATE" = 
'U.S. Virgin Islands' ) 
iii) Project Data from GCS_North_American_1983 to GSC_WGS_1984 
(1) ArcToolbox  Data Management Tools  Projections and Transformations 
 Feature  Project 
(a) Input Dataset of Feature Class = State layer added 
(b) Output Dataset or Feature Class = State_Layer (save within GDB created 
earlier) 
(c) Output Coordinate System = GCS_WGS_1984 
(d) Geographic Transformation  NAD_1983_To_WGS_1984_1 
(e) Click OK 
(2) Rename new layer to something that describes it (i.e. State Boundaries, 2005) 
(3) Remove original statep020 file from layers 
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c) Steams and Waterbodies Data 
i) Add data  Steams and Waterbodies Data (shape file) 
ii) Filter Data such that only the Great Lakes are shown 
(1) Right Click Layer  Properties  Definition Query  Query Builder 
(2) Paste into field  "NAME" = 'Lake Huron' OR "NAME" = 'Lake Michigan' 
OR "NAME" = 'Lake Ontario' OR "NAME" = 'Lake Superior' OR "NAME" = 
'Lake Erie' 
iii) Project Data from GCS_North_American_1983 to GSC_WGS_1984 
(1) ArcToolbox  Data Management Tools  Projections and Transformations 
 Feature  Project 
(a) Input Dataset of Feature Class = Water layer added 
(b) Output Dataset or Feature Class = Water_Layer (save within GDB created 
earlier) 
(c) Output Coordinate System = GCS_WGS_1984 
(d) Geographic Transformation  NAD_1983_To_WGS_1984_1 
(e) Click OK 
(2) Rename new layer to something that describes it (i.e. Great Lakes, 2006) 
(3) Remove original hydrogm020 from layers 
d) Federal Land Data 
i) Add data  Federal Land Data (shape file) 
ii) Filter Data such that only counties for the continental United States are shown 
(1) Right Click Layer  Properties  Definition Query  Query Builder 
(2) Paste into field  "FULLNAME" = 'Altus AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 
'Andrews AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Arnold AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 
'Barksdale AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Beale AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 
'Bolling AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Buckley AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 
'Cannon AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Charleston AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 
'Columbus AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Creech AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 
'Davis- Monthan AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Dover AFB' OR "FULLNAME" 
= 'Dyess AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Edwards AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 
'Eglin AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Ellsworth AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'F E 
Warren AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Fairchild AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 
'Goodfellow AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Grand Forks AFB' OR 
"FULLNAME" = 'Hanscom AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Hill AFB' OR 
"FULLNAME" = 'Holloman AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Hurlburt Fld' OR 
"FULLNAME" = 'Keesler AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Kirtland AFB' OR 
"FULLNAME" = 'Lackland AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Langley AFB' OR 
"FULLNAME" = 'Laughlin AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Little Rock AFB' OR 
"FULLNAME" = 'Los Angeles Air Force Base (Area A)' OR "FULLNAME" 
= 'Luke AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Macdill AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 
'Malmstrom AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Maxwell AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 
'Maxwell Air Force Base (Gunter Annex)' OR "FULLNAME" = 'McChord 
AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'McConnell AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'McGuire 
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AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Minot AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Moody AFB' 
OR "FULLNAME" = 'Mountain Home AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Nellis 
AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Offutt AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Patrick AFB' 
OR "FULLNAME" = 'Peterson AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Pope AFB' OR 
"FULLNAME" = 'Randolph AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Robins AFB' OR 
"FULLNAME" = 'Scott AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Seymour Johnson AFB' 
OR "FULLNAME" = 'Shaw AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Sheppard AFB' OR 
"FULLNAME" = 'Tinker AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Travis AFB' OR 
"FULLNAME" = 'Tyndall AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Vance AFB' OR 
"FULLNAME" = 'Vandenberg AFB' OR "FULLNAME" = 'Whiteman AFB' 
OR "FULLNAME" = 'Wright-Patterson AFB' 
iii) Create Centroid of Base Areas 
(1) Right Click on Layer  Open Attribute Table  
(2) Options  Add Field (Latitude) 
(a) Latitude 
(i) Name = Centrd_Lat 
(ii) Type = Double 
(b) Longitude 
(i) Name = Centrd_Lon 
(ii) Type = Double 
(3) Field Calculations 
(a) Right Click “Centroid_Lat”  Field Calculator…  Click YES 
(b) Check the box for Advanced  Paste:   
Dim Output As Double 
Dim pArea As IArea 
Set pArea = [Shape] 
Output = pArea.Centroid.Y 
(c) In the box on the bottom, type OUTPUT 
(d) Click OK 
(e) Right Click “Centroid_Lon”  Field Calculator…  Click YES 
(f) Check the box for Advanced  Paste:   
Dim Output As Double 
Dim pArea As IArea 
Set pArea = [Shape] 
Output = pArea.Centroid.X 
(g) In the box on the bottom, type OUTPUT 
(h) Click OK 
iv) Project Data from GCS_North_American_1983 to GSC_WGS_1984 
(1) Arc Toolbox  Data Management Tools  Projections and Transformations 
 Feature  Project 
(a) Input Dataset of Feature Class = Federal Land layer added 
(b) Output Dataset or Feature Class = AF_Installations_Layer (save within 
GDB created earlier) 
(c) Output Coordinate System = GCS_WGS_1984 
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(d) Geographic Transformation  NAD_1983_To_WGS_1984_1 
(e) Click OK 
(2) Rename new layer to something that describes it (i.e. AF Installations, 2009) 
(3) Remove original tl_2009_us_mil from layers 
v) Create XY Data for Installation Centroids 
(1) Right Click Projected layer from [iv) (2)]’  Open Attribute Table  
(a) Options  Export… (save within GDB file) 
(b) Click YES to add it to the current file 
(2) Source Tab  Right Click New Table (from above)  Display XY Data… 
(a) X Field = Centrd_Lon 
(b) Y Field = Centrd_Lat 
(c) Click Edit…  Select…  Geographic Coordinate Systems  World  
WGS 1984.prj (click ADD) 
(d) Click OK  Click OK 
(3) Rename new layer to something that describes it (i.e. AF Installations Points, 
2009) 
 
5) Enable ArcToolbox & setup Environments 
a) Right click on the ArcToolbox Area  Environments… 
b) General Settings 
i) Current Workspace  “PowerOutageAnalysis” 
ii) Scratch Workspace  “PowerOutageAnalysis” 
iii) Output Coordinate System  As Specified Below  GCS_WGS_1984 
iv) Output has Z Values  same as input 
v) Output has M Values  same as input 
vi) Extent  Same as layer “State Boundaries, 2005” 
c) Raster Analysis Settings 
i) Cell Size  As specified below  0.04 
ii) Mask  “State Boundaries, 2005” 
d) Click OK 
 
6) Data Collected from EIA necessary to perform the Analysis (for the purpose of this 
thesis, all data has been collected and scrubbed within the Excel file ‘GIS Data – 
Power Outages.xls’ 
a) Add Data  Find ‘GIS Data – Power Outages.xls’  Select tab/file 'Outage Data-GIS 
Rdy$'  Click Add 
b) Source Tab  Right Click 'Outage Data-GIS Rdy$'  Display XY Data… 
i) X Field = Long-EST 
ii) Y Field = Lat-EST 
iii) Click Edit…  Select…  Geographic Coordinate Systems  World  WGS 
1984.prj (click ADD) 
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iv) Display Tab  Right click the outputted layer from above  Data…  Export 
Data…  
v) Save within GDB file (created earlier)  Change name to ‘PowerOutage_Output’ 
vi) Click YES to add it to the map as a new layer file 
vii) Right click the old file  Remove 
c) Right click (new layer)  Rename: EIA Complete Power Outages_2009 
 
7) Add in Consolidated data (similar to above) 
a) Add Data  Find ‘GIS Data – Power Outages.xls’  Select tab/file 
‘Summary_ByElecComp$'  Click Add 
b) Source Tab  Right Click Summary_ByElecComp $'  Display XY Data… 
i) X Field = Long-EST 
ii) Y Field = Lat-EST 
iii) Click Edit…  Select…  Geographic Coordinate Systems  World  WGS 
1984.prj (click ADD) 
iv) Display Tab  Right click the outputted layer from above  Data…  Export 
Data…  
v) Save within GDB file (created earlier)  Change name to 
‘PowerOutageCons_Output’ 
vi) Click YES to add it to the map as a new layer file 
vii) Right click the old file  Remove 
c) Right click (new layer)  Rename: EIA Consolidated Power Outages_2009 
 
8) FORMATTING: 
a) Display Tab  Highlight the following layers (downloaded/modified layers): 
i) AF Installation Pts, 2009 
ii) AF Installations, 2009 
iii) Great Lakes, 2006 
iv) County Boundaries, 2006 
v) State Boundaries, 2005 
vi) Right click  Group (change the name to ‘Existing Layers’) 
b) Display Tab  Highlight the following layers (downloaded/modified layers): 
i) EIA Complete Power Outages_2009 
ii) EIA Consolidated Power Outages_2009 
iii) Right click  Group (change the name to ‘EIA Power Outages’) 
 
9) Analysis (Individual Outages) – Include all changes done to the maps as well 
a) Inverse Distance Weighted (MW Loss) 
i) ArcToolbox Spatial Analyst Tools  Interpolation  IDW 
(1) Input point features = EIA Complete Power Outages_2009 
(2) Z value field = MW_Loss 
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(3) Output Raster = IDW_Ind_MW_Loss (save within GDB created earlier) 
(4) Output cell size (optional) = 0.04 
(5) Power = 2 
(6) Search Radius (option) = Variable 
(a) Number of points = 12 
(b) Maximum Distance = (BLANK) 
(7) Input barrier polyline features (optional) = (BLANK) 
ii) Right click the added layer  Properties…  
(1) Display (TAB)  Transparency = 45% 
(2) Symbology (TAB)  Show (Left side)  Click CLASSIFIED  Click YES 
(a) Classification  Classes = 5 
(b) Classification  Classify  Method = Natural Breaks (Jenks)  Click 
OK 
(c) Color Ramp  GREEN to RED (left to right) 
iii) Click OK 
b) Inverse Distance Weighted (Number of people affected) 
i) ArcToolbox Spatial Analyst Tools  Interpolation  IDW 
(1) Input point features = EIA Complete Power Outages_2009 
(2) Z value field = No_Affecte 
(3) Output Raster = IDW_Ind_No_Affected (save within GDB created earlier) 
(4) Output cell size (optional) = 0.04 
(5) Power = 2 
(6) Search Radius (option) = Variable 
(a) Number of points = 12 
(b) Maximum Distance = (BLANK) 
(7) Input barrier polyline features (optional) = (BLANK) 
ii) Right click the added layer  Properties…  
(1) Display (TAB)  Transparency = 45% 
(2) Symbology (TAB)  Show (Left side)  Click CLASSIFIED  Click YES 
(a) Classification  Classes = 5 
(b) Classification  Classify  Method = Natural Breaks (Jenks)  Click 
OK 
(c) Color Ramp  GREEN to RED (left to right) 
iii) Click OK 
c) Inverse Distance Weighted (Outage Total Duration) 
i) ArcToolbox Spatial Analyst Tools  Interpolation  IDW 
(1) Input point features = EIA Complete Power Outages_2009 
(2) Z value field = Total_HRs 
(3) Output Raster = IDW_Ind_Hours_Off (save within GDB created earlier) 
(4) Output cell size (optional) = 0.04 
(5) Power = 2 
(6) Search Radius (option) = Variable 
(a) Number of points = 12 
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(b) Maximum Distance = (BLANK) 
(7) Input barrier polyline features (optional) = (BLANK) 
ii) Right click the added layer  Properties…  
(1) Display (TAB)  Transparency = 45% 
(2) Symbology (TAB)  Show (Left side)  Click CLASSIFIED  Click YES 
(a) Classification  Classes = 5 
(b) Classification  Classify  Method = Natural Breaks (Jenks)  Click 
OK 
(c) Color Ramp  GREEN to RED (left to right) 
iii) Click OK 
d) Raster Calculator (Individual Outage Calculated Vulnerability) 
i) Ensure the Spatial Analyst Toolbar is enabled.  If not: 
(1) View  Toolbars  Spatial Analyst 
(2) Dock the toolbar  
ii) Spatial Analyst  Raster Calculator 
(1) Copy the following expression to the open space  
(([IDW_Cons_Hours_Off] / 52.59) * 0.4) + (([IDW_Cons_MW_Loss] / 
598.78) * 0.5) + (([IDW_Cons_No_Affected] / 195553.13) * 0.1) 
(2) Click Evaluate (it might take up to an hour to complete the analysis, depending 
on computer speeds) 
iii) Right click the added layer  Properties…  
(1) General (TAB)  Layer Name = ‘IDW_Ind_Calculated_Vulnerability’ 
(2) Display (TAB)  Transparency = 45% 
(3) Symbology (TAB)  Show (Left side)  Click CLASSIFIED  Click YES 
(a) Classification  Classes = 5 
(b) Classification  Classify  Method = Natural Breaks (Jenks)  Click 
OK 
(c) Color Ramp  GREEN to RED (left to right) 
iv) Click OK 
 
10) Analysis (Consolidated Outages) 
a) Inverse Distance Weighted (MW Loss) 
i) ArcToolbox Spatial Analyst Tools  Interpolation  IDW 
(1) Input point features = EIA Complete Power Outages_2009 
(2) Z value field = MW_Loss 
(3) Output Raster = IDW_Cons_MW_Loss (save within GDB created earlier) 
(4) Output cell size (optional) = 0.04 
(5) Power = 2 
(6) Search Radius (option) = Variable 
(a) Number of points = 12 
(b) Maximum Distance = (BLANK) 
(7) Input barrier polyline features (optional) = (BLANK) 
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ii) Right click the added layer  Properties…  
(1) Display (TAB)  Transparency = 45% 
(2) Symbology (TAB)  Show (Left side)  Click CLASSIFIED  Click YES 
(a) Classification  Classes = 5 
(b) Classification  Classify  Method = Natural Breaks (Jenks)  Click 
OK 
(c) Color Ramp  GREEN to RED (left to right) 
iii) Click OK 
b) Inverse Distance Weighted (Number of people affected) 
i) ArcToolbox Spatial Analyst Tools  Interpolation  IDW 
(1) Input point features = EIA Complete Power Outages_2009 
(2) Z value field = No_Affected 
(3) Output Raster = IDW_Cons _No_Affected (save within GDB created earlier) 
(4) Output cell size (optional) = 0.04 
(5) Power = 2 
(6) Search Radius (option) = Variable 
(a) Number of points = 12 
(b) Maximum Distance = (BLANK) 
(7) Input barrier polyline features (optional) = (BLANK) 
ii) Right click the added layer  Properties…  
(1) Display (TAB)  Transparency = 45% 
(2) Symbology (TAB)  Show (Left side)  Click CLASSIFIED  Click YES 
(a) Classification  Classes = 5 
(b) Classification  Classify  Method = Natural Breaks (Jenks)  Click 
OK 
(c) Color Ramp  GREEN to RED (left to right) 
iii) Click OK 
c) Inverse Distance Weighted (Outage Total Duration) 
i) ArcToolbox Spatial Analyst Tools  Interpolation  IDW 
(1) Input point features = EIA Complete Power Outages_2009 
(2) Z value field = Total_HRs 
(3) Output Raster = IDW_Cons_Hours_Off (save within GDB created earlier) 
(4) Output cell size (optional) = 0.04 
(5) Power = 2 
(6) Search Radius (option) = Variable 
(a) Number of points = 12 
(b) Maximum Distance = (BLANK) 
(7) Input barrier polyline features (optional) = (BLANK) 
ii) Right click the added layer  Properties…  
(1) Display (TAB)  Transparency = 45% 
(2) Symbology (TAB)  Show (Left side)  Click CLASSIFIED  Click YES 
(a) Classification  Classes = 5 
(b) Classification  Classify  Method = Natural Breaks (Jenks)  Click 
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OK 
(c) Color Ramp  GREEN to RED (left to right) 
iii) Click OK 
d) Raster Calculator (Consolidated Outage Calculated Vulnerability) 
i) Ensure the Spatial Analyst Toolbar is enabled.  If not: 
(1) View  Toolbars  Spatial Analyst 
(2) Dock the toolbar  
ii) Spatial Analyst  Raster Calculator 
(1) Copy the following expression to the open space  
(([IDW_Cons_Hours_Off] / 212.966) * 0.4) + (([IDW_Cons_MW_Loss] / 
2375.012) * 0.5) + (([IDW_Cons_No_Affected] / 754639.069) * 0.1) 
(2) Click Evaluate (it might take up to an hour to complete the analysis, depending 
on computer speeds) 
iii) Right click the added layer  Properties…  
(1) General (TAB)  Layer Name = ‘IDW_Cons_Calculated_Vulnerability’ 
(2) Display (TAB)  Transparency = 45% 
(3) Symbology (TAB)  Show (Left side)  Click CLASSIFIED  Click YES 
(a) Classification  Classes = 5 
(b) Classification  Classify  Method = Natural Breaks (Jenks)  Click 
OK 
(c) Color Ramp  GREEN to RED (left to right) 
iv) Click OK 
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APPENDIX E.  Calculated IDW (Number Affected) 
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APPENDIX F.  Calculated IDW (Duration) 
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APPENDIX G.  Calculated IDW (Power Loss) 
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APPENDIX H.  Calculated Weighted Vulnerability 
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